Financing the Acquisition of New Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code by Hogan, William E
Boston College Law Review
Volume 3 | Issue 2 Article 1
1-1-1962
Financing the Acquisition of New Goods Under
the Uniform Commercial Code
William E. Hogan
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Commercial Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please
contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation







WINTER, 1962	 NUMBER 2
FINANCING THE ACQUISITION OF NEW GOODS
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
WILLIAM E. HOGAN *
I. INTRODUCTION
With a characteristically slow and deliberate pace American law
has observed, and then occasionally absorbed, our national concern
for moving massive quantities of goods from the production line to
the ultimate user. Radio, television, magazines, the press, even the
daily mails, flood our lives with solicitations for particular products.
To these must be added the messages, often inspirational in tone, from
both major political camps about the apparently desperate need to
raise our gross national product another notch.
Strangers to our society quickly note that the much romanced
buyer needs little or no cash to purchase these goods. Sellers often
hawk their wares on the basis of the amount of the down payment, or
the small monthly payment, rather than upon the ultimate total cost
to the consumer. Department stores, discount firms, mail-order houses,
and banks proclaim their willingness to give customers a line of credit
to make the purchases of their choice. The growing number of finance
companies related to business equipment suppliers attests to the fact
that the need for cash does not wax when the purchaser is a com-
mercial as distinct from an individual consumer.
Whether we study the acquisition of new goods from the viewpoint
of the practicing lawyer, the banker, the businessman, the economist,
or the legal scholar, it soon becomes evident that we deal here with
something unique and quite distinct from other forms of extending
credit secured by personal property. Whether we examine the legal
scheme for such transactions under the Uniform Commercial Code
or under the prior law of a given state, as lawyers we can quickly per-
ceive that a special and advantageous position is given to the financer
of newly acquired property.
* Associate Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. A.B. 1949, LL.B. 1952, Boston
College.
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Non-Code law creates this privileged category more obscurely in
the special treatment afforded those familiar tools of secured com-
mercial financing, the conditional sale and the trust receipt. In fact,
the struggle to establish these devices in the face of a frequently hos-
tile and often rigorous body of chattel mortgage law has been aptly
described as an attempt to tailor the legal mechanisms to the func-
tional needs of business, and as an experiment by business prior
to any legal recognition of these needs. 1 The increased frequency of the
credit sale brought with it an increased demand for legal tools simple
enough to be effectively executed by sales and clerical personnel un-
skilled in the intricacies of the law of personal property security. Since
public recording requirements were the most severe legal demands,
the purchase money financer called for their abolition or at least for
an easier kind of filing than that permitted for chattel mortgages.
Where that demand was rejected by judicial refusal to recognize the
conditional sale or the trust receipt, one of two consequences usually
followed. On the one hand, legislation might be enacted validating the
old device and permitting the arrangement to be effective with a less
rigorous or no public recordation.' On the other hand, the ingenuity of
the bar might devise a new technique which would permit more flex-
ibility and less formal methods of operation.' In Pennsylvania the lat-
1
 Isaacs, The Economic Advantages and Disadvantages of the Various Methods of
Selling Goods on Credit, 8 Cornell L.Q. 199 (1923).
2 In
 Maryland in the absence of statute conditional sale is ineffective against bona
fide purchasers from vendee. Praeger v. Emerson-Brantingham Implement Co., 122 Md.
303, 89 Atl. 501 (1914). Maryland provided for conditional sales recording in 1916.
Laws of 1916, ch. 355. The history of present Article 21, § 66 of the Maryland Code is
traced in Tattlebaum v. Pantex Mfg. Corp., 204 Md. 360, 104 A.2d 813 (1954). In
Michigan conditional sales for resale must be recorded. Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 442.101,
556.140-566.146 (1948).
3
 Some transactions employed both a chattel mortgage and a conditional sale. This
was disturbing to those attempting to retain the distinction. "If the instruments are
separate it would seem that the first to take effect should control; if an attempt is made
to arrange the two transactions in the same instrument, or in separate instruments taking
effect at the same time, it will he a difficult question of fact to find the controlling domi-
nant intent". Bogert, Commentaries on Conditional Sales, 2A Uniform Laws Ann. 12.
It was also suggested that the answer should turn on the issue of whether the vendor
had parted with "title". Magill, The Legal Advantages and Disadvantages of the Various
Methods of Selling Goods on Credit, 8 Cornell L.Q. 210, 221 (1923). Still another sug-
gestion was made that the answer be based on a construction of the document against
the draftsman, the vendor. Note, 20 Colum. L. Rev. 493 (1920). Compare In re Ger-
man Publication Society, 289 Fed. 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1922) (distinction between pledge and
chattel mortgage floats nebulously in that fog—the intent of the parties). In formulat-
ing the Uniform Conditional Sales Act and the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, the sugges-
tion that the devices be merged was rejected. Burdick, Codifying the Law of Condi-
tional Sales, 18 Colum. L. Rev. 103, 107 (1918); Commissioners' Prefatory Note, Uni-
form Trust Receipts Act, 9C Uniform Laws Ann. 223-24. The same kind of ingenuity
has more recently developed the leasing device. Grant, Illusion in Lease Financing, 37
Harv. Bus. Rev., March-April 1959, p. 121. UCC § 1-201(37) includes leases intended
as security within Article 9's requirements. See Kripke, Conceptual Obsolescence in Law
and Accounting-Finance Relations Between Retailer and Assignee of Retail Receivables,
1 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 55 (1959).
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ter technique was developed, and the result was called the "bailment
lease".4
 In England the new arrangement was labeled a "hire-pur-
chase" contract.° Although the opinions were usually written in rather
abstract terms, judicial recognition of these new devices followed upon
the realization that the legitimate business needs required a relatively
simple and elastic means for securing the debt arising from the acqui-
sition of new goods. Of course, other motivations can be traced in all
these developments. In some respects the various purchase money
techniques offered an opportunity to avoid the usury laws by bringing
the deal within the "time sale" rule, and frequently remedial advan-
tages accrued to the secured party who could employ the conditional
sales type machinery.° Nonetheless, these matters should not obscure
the basic fact that a principal reason for the search for a security ve-
hicle distinctly limited to purchase money, rested upon the need for a
legally acceptable and practically workable means of protecting the
secured party against the debtor and against the risk of losing the
collateral to third parties. The volume of purchase money financing
simply demanded legal recognition.
Despite the fact that much ink has been put to paper extolling
the Commercial Code's adoption of a single unitary concept, the
"security interest", in place of the hodgepodge of devices under the
prior law, the Code itself candidly isolates the purchase money trans-
action.' Furthermore, the Code creates several advantages for that
4
 Montgomery, The Pennsylvania Bailment Lease, 79 U. Pa. L. Rev. 920 (1931).
The device could not be used for previously owned collateral and for financing collateral
which the bailee planned to sell. Note, 56 Dick. L. Rev. 337 (1952).
5
 The seller in fact sells to the financing agency, which in turn pays the seller and
then lets the car to the user on "hire-purchase" terms. When there is a genuine transfer
from the seller to the financing agency, the contract need not be recorded under the
Bills of Sales Acts, 1878 and 1882. McEntire v. Crossley Brothers Ltd., [18951 A.C. 457;
Helby v. Matthews, [1895] A.C. 471. Waldock, The Law of Mortgages 97 (1950). For
the controls placed on such contracts in the interests of debtor protection, see Wild, The
Law of Hire-Purchase (1960).
6 The argument that there is a sufficient distinction between bona fide price for a
sale on credit and a loan has lost ground in light of the extensive regulatory statutes
governing finance charges. Warren, Regulation of Finance Charges in Retail Instalment
Sales, 68 Yale L.J. 839 (1959), and the growing minority view that sales on credit are
within the usury laws. Symposium, 55 Nw. U.L. Rev. 301, 308 (1960) ; Note, 71 Harv.
L. Rev. 1143 (1958); Note, 57 Mich. L. Rev. 298 (1958). The common law doctrine
of election of remedies requiring the financing conditional seller to choose either a suit
for a deficiency or the recapture of the goods was in some ways harsh, since in cases of
recapture of the goods the buyer would forfeit his payments; but it was modified first
by contract and later by statutes. See Warren, Statutory Damages and the Conditional
Sale, 20 Ohio St. L.J. 289 (1959).
7 UCC § 9-107. (Unless otherwise indicated, all Code citations are to the Uniform
Commercial Code, 1958 Official Text with Comments (1958). Citations to Article 9,
as enacted in a given state, refer to the reports in 1 & 2 Condit. Sale-Chat. Mort. Rep.
(1961) under each Code state.) The Comment to UCC § 9-101 elaborately discusses
the abolition of the distinctions based on form and the substitution of distinctions based
on the type of property involved. Unfortunately, no mention is made of the retention
of the purchase money distinction.
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device, principally by eliminating the need for filing in certain cases
(Section 9-302), by allowing a delay in filing in other cases (Section
9-301), and by creating a special rule of priority over other security
interests (Section 9-312 (3) and (4)).
It is the purpose of this paper to analyze the provisions of the
Code pertaining to purchase money financing not only to determine
where the Code solves old difficulties, but also to isolate and examine
those cases where the Code may create distinctly new problems.
II. COLLATERAL HELD BY THE DEBTOR FOR USE: EQUIPMENT,
CONSUMER GOODS
A. Creating the Security interest
1. The Security Agreement. Where the collateral must remain
in the possession of the debtor, the Code's purchase money security in-
terest is the simplest and most effective means of obtaining such pro-
tection as a secured position provides against the risks associated
with lending. At the outset the seller, or the financer who takes an
assignment from the seller, is relatively sure that the buyer has not
previously encumbered the goods. This is true under both Code and
non
-Code law. If the financing is accomplished in the form of a con-
ditional sale, the goods coming into the buyer's control are, unlike
previously owned property, probably not burdened with another se-
cured debt. Where a financing agency takes a transfer of the buyer's
contract from the seller, there is assurance that all of the seller's in-
terest, as well as that created by the buyer, is transferred.
Where a seller furnishes the credit, his route to a secured position
is simple and unencumbered under the Code; more importantly this
route is strikingly parallel to that provided by present law. The same
statement is true where a financing agency enters the transaction by
taking an assignment from the seller. Under the Code the seller must
first be certain that the buyer-debtor has signed the "security agree-
ment", describing the collateral.' The _description need not be "spe-
cific if it reasonably identifies what is described"." No other formal-
ities are required by the Code itself. Thus, the typical non-Code con-
.
ditional sales form would satisfy all Code formal requirements.
It is possible to speak in a generalized way about the typical non-
Code conditional sales form, but one must be alert to the fact that
the law of a particular jurisdiction might call for specific disclosures
of certain information about the transaction and the buyer's rights
and might also demand or prohibit certain contract provisions, e.g.,
clauses for confession of judgment.'" Although usually directed to-
8 UCC f 9 -204,
9 ITC § 9-110.
fo It may
 be an unfortunate accident of history that the state which was first to
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ward consumer protection, these statutes may also apply whether one
deals with an individual debtor or with a business debtor. 11
With that limitation in mind, the typical conditional sales form
normally includes a statement of the purchase price, the amount of
the down payment, the unpaid balance, the finance charges, the
amount, number, and due date of any payments, and an indication of
any delinquency charges. The description of any machine reveals the
manufacturer, the model and serial numbers, as well as the type or
kind of machine involved.
Further, the form frequently includes covenants whereby the
buyer undertakes to keep the property free of liens and encum-
brances,' to insure, and to refrain from secreting, removing, misusing
or disposing of the collateral. Aiming at the possibility of default,
there might also be provisions for acceleration of the obligation in the
event of a breach of the duty to make any payment or of the obligations
imposed by the agreement." For the same reasons, there might be
contractual undertakings governing the procedure for realization upon
default.
Although the default provisions can be safely omitted under the
Code, it may be desirable to retain provisions defining the obligation
of the parties imposed by the statute." All other provisions can, and
more significantly, should be retained. The permission that the Code
grants for less specific and detailed arrangements should not be read
as a guarantee that the secured party does not increase his risks by
using such short forms.
First of all, the use of as detailed a description as possible, in-
cluding the use for which the debtor purchases the property, is helpful
in establishing that the particular collateral is "equipment" or "con-
sumer goods". Such a classification of the collateral will be crucial in
determining the issues relating to filing, priority, sub-purchasers, and
default. Section 9-109 groups all goods as "consumer goods", "equip-
enact the Code is quite liberal in regard to judgment notes, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 739
(1953). Much of the earlier Code case law has been concerned with reopening such
judgments,
11
 Hogan, A Survey of State Retail Instalment Sales Legislation, 44 Cornell L.Q.
38, 72 (1958). The Code explicitly makes these regulatory statutes control the provi-
sions of Article 9. UCC §§ 9-201, 9-203.
12
 See text following notes 61 and 121 infra for a discussion indicating the special
practical significance of this clause in disputes involving two conflicting purchase money
security interests.
13
 UCC § 1-208 places a duty of good faith, i.e., honesty in fact (§ 1-201(19))
on the person accelerating "at will" or "when he deems himself insecure". It does not
seem likely that the added requirement that a merchant must observe "reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade" to be in good faith under Article 2
will affect the duty imposed in Article I. See UCC § 2-103.
14 Dealing with realization upon default, UCC § 9-501 permits the parties to es-
tablish standards (which are not "manifestly unreasonable") even as to those duties and
rights which cannot be waived or varied,
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ment", "farm products", or "inventory". Goods are said to be "equip-
ment", "if they are used or bought for use primarily in business (in-
cluding farming or a profession) or by a debtor who is a non-profit
organization or a governmental subdivision or agency or if the goods
are not included in the definitions of inventory, farm products or con-
sumer goods ...." Once it is established that the goods are bought for
use in a business, the definition is principally a negative one, and as
a consequence it is necessary to examine whether the collateral can
be classified as "inventory".
Inventory includes goods held for sale, lease, or for use under
service contracts," raw materials, work in process, or materials used
or consumed in a business." For example, a typewriter used in the
office of a stationery store would be equipment, while the typewriters
held for sale or rental would be inventory. On the other hand, both
the paper held for sale and the paper used in the office would fall into
the inventory category, since both are either held for sale or consumed
in the business.
"Consumer goods" are more easily identified, since the character-
ization is wholly drawn from the fact that they are used or bought
primarily for personal, family or household purposes. 0
 Some poten-
tially troublesome cases can be isolated. Is a doctor's car to be
classed as equipment or as consumer goods? Similarly, the truck of
a small part-time farmer or the private car of a salesman create prob-
lems of classification. Where such doubt arises it does not create an
insoluble counselling problem because the secured party can, for
example, file where filing might be excused under Section 9-302 or
file on both bases where there is doubt as to the proper place to file
under Section 9-401.
Secondly, the form of the arrangement should also clearly indi-
cate that the transaction is "a purchase money security interest". The
traditional conditional sales forms used in the traditional way will
usually satisfy this need. On the other hand, where the financer en-
gaged in financing acquisitions of new goods by means of a chattel
mortgage taken directly from the buyer, the law did not clearly isolate
his status.' Here the Code offers a new opportunity to the secured
15
 Goods furnished by the debtor under service contracts as well as goods held to
be furnished under such contracts are included. UCC § 9-109(4).
UCC § 9-109(4).
17 UCC § 9-109(1).
18
 In some cases special treatment has been afforded to purchase money chattel
mortgages as to the:
Formal requisites of execution: In re Chubby's Parkchester, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 701
(S.D.N.Y. 1951) (two-third stockholder consent required by N.Y. Stock Corp. Law
§ 16 not applicable to purchase money chattel mortgages) ;
Applicability of bulk transfer laws: Citizens' Nat'l Trust & Say. Bank v. Gardner,
161 F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 1947) ; In re Rosom Utilities, Inc., 105 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1939) ;
In re Mercury Engineering, 68 F. Supp. 376 (S.D. Cal. 1946) ;
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party to qualify as a purchase money financer even though he does
not deal with the seller in any way. Consequently, where such a lender
employed a chattel mortgage form under non-Code law, he should in-
clude a provision clearly indicating that the value is given to "enable
the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collateral" and further,
he should be certain that the "value is in fact so used"." In such
a case the secured party who is intent upon obtaining the advantages
associated with purchase money financing must police the activity of
the debtor at least to the extent necessary to make certain that the
advance is paid to the supplier of the goods. A check made payable to
the seller, a letter of credit, or even a covenant in the security agree-
ment may be aids to assure that the advance is so used. Where the
seller himself finances the transaction, or where the financing agency
becomes the secured party by assignment from the seller, it will be
apparent from the sales contract that the debt relates to the acquisi-
tion of the goods.
2. Rights in the Collateral. After the execution of the appro-
priate security agreement, the buyer-debtor must still have "rights in
the collateral" before the in rem property interest securing the debt can
attach.
Problems can arise here when the financer is dealing as the sell-
er's assignee in a fictitious sales transaction, a phenomenon not wholly
unknown in the law of secured transactions." Neither the Code nor
the non-Code law can solve this problem to the satisfaction of the
secured party. Creating a property interest where no property exists
or where there is no underlying transaction is awkward conceptually.
Where the seller himself does the financing, the risk of the fictitious
contract can be avoided by appropriate internal controls over his
employees. Similarly, the financing firm which takes assignments of
such contracts must police the seller-assignor or take steps to collect
directly from the debtor-buyer. In both cases the secured party can
avoid the risk by using business sense rather than legal devices. The.
"rights in the collateral" problem can also arise in other factual pat-
Recording: In re Lewis, 230 Iowa 694, 298 N.W. 842, 137 A.L.R. 562 (1941)_
Compare Yetley v. Irons, 238 Iowa 23, 25 N.W.2d 677, 168 A.L.R. 1159 (1947), and
Miller v. Sulmeyer, 263 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1959) ;
Fraud as to creditors based on dominion by debtor: Cox v. Birmingham Dry Goods
Co., 125 Ala. 320, 28 So. 456 (1899) ; Dodds v. Pratt, 64 Miss. 123, 8 So. 167 (1886) ;
Hall v. Keating Implement & Machine Co., 33 Tex. Civ. App. 526, 77 S.W. 1054 (1903) ;
Conaway's Adm'r v. Steaky, 44 W. Va. 163, 28 S.E. 793 (1897) ; see Annot., 73 A.L.R.
236; and
Priority: United States v, Chickering, 27 F. Supp. 377 (D.N.H. 1939) ; Hammel v.
First Nat'l Bank, 129 Mich. 176, 88 N.W. 397 (1901).
19 UCC § 9 - 107.
20 Apparently as an inventory financing device, demonstrator cars were frequently
"sold" to salesmen under conditional sales contracts which were then transferred to a
financing agency, e.g., Tripp v. Nat'l Shawmut Bank, 263 Mass. 505, 161 N.E. 904,-
(1928) ; Clark v. Corser, 154 Minn. 508, 191 N.W. 917 (1923).
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terns where the law is willing to find that one with no rights himself is
able to create rights in another. A financer taking by assignment can-
not assume that the seller of the goods has an undisputed claim to the
goods. First, an earlier transaction supporting the seller's claim to
the goods may be voidable by reason of fraud, duress, illegality, and
the like. Here the secured party who takes an assignment from the
seller may find protection in asserting that he, as well as the buyer in
the financed transaction, qualifies as a bona fide purchaser. The Sales
provisions of the Code enlarge and clarify the rights of such a' pur-
chaser. Section 2-403 (1) makes effective a transfer to a bona fide
purchaser for value by a person with a voidable title. In addition,
problem areas under the non-Code law are isolated and made subject
to the rule, Consequently, the bona fide purchaser prevails where the
earlier transaction is defective because of a fraudulent misrepresen-
tation as to identity, or as a cash sale, or because of a dishonored
check, or due to any fraud punishable as larceny under the criminal
law. All of these questions have been troublesome under non-Code law,
but the Code resolves these issues in favor of the bona fide purchaser
for value class, which includes the secured party. The Code extends
a new protection to a special kind of bona fide purchaser in Section
2 -403(2) when a "buyer in ordinary course of business" 2 ' prevails
over the claim of one who entrusts goods to a dealer in goods of that
kind. Secured parties are not included in the special group, but the
argument is open that the buyer in a purchase money transaction does
qualify, and the secured party derives his interest from the buyer who
does fall into the safeguarded category."
In addition to the issues arising when an underlying previous
transaction is upset, the definition of a purchase money security in-
terest itself raises questions of "rights in the collateral". Section 9-107
requires either a financing seller, or a third party who "by making
advances or incurring an obligation gives value to enable the debtor
to acquire rights in or the use of collateral if such value is in fact so
used". Obviously, the requirements here are not exactly the same as
the "rights in the collateral" test in the creation of the security in-
terest," since the debtor may acquire either the use of or rights in the
collateral.
21 UCC § 1-201(9) carefully defines the buyer in the ordinary course, and the defi-
nition is significant in Articles 2, 7, and 9. See UCC §§ 2-403(2), 7-205 and 9-307(1).
22
 Care must be taken in using this argument, since it ignores the inventory
financer's claims to proceeds in contests between an inventory financer and a purchaser
of instalment paper arising from the sale of the inventory. Kripke, Inventory Financing
of Hard Goods, 1956 Ill. L.F. 580, 596. Compare UCC §§ 9-306 and 9-308 with Collins,
The Retail Paper Purchaser and The Proceeds Lien, 1 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 97
(1959).
23
 The security interest cannot attach until the debtor has rights in the collateral.
UCC § 9-204. Consequently, perfection cannot occur until that time. UCC § 9-303.
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The difference in the language in Sections 9-204 and 9-107(b)
at first blush suggests that some transactions can be classified as pur-
chase money where the non-selling secured party supplies value to
enable the debtor to obtain merely the use of the collateral without
any rights in the property, while no security interest could attach to
the property because the debtor had use of, but no rights in, the prop-
erty. However attracted the Hohfeldian-oriented may be to this
approach, it should be rejected in the interests of common sense; and
the addition of the word "use" in Section 9-107 should properly be
considered as an explicit recognition of one kind of "right".
Reading the Code as a whole in search of the meaning of the word
"rights" in Section 9-107(b) leads to the conclusion that the term
"rights" is not limited to full-fledged, outright ownership. In Section
1-201(37) the term "security interest" is defined to include reserva-
tions of title by a lessor where a lease is intended as security. Further-
more, Section 9-112 provides for situations where the collateral is not
owned by the debtor. Finally, in Section 2-403(1) the later mortgagee
from a buyer who fraudulently induced the original sale may prevail
over the defrauded seller's claim to the goods. Thus, the defrauding
buyer's power to convey to the mortgagee must qualify as a "right"
to the collateral under Section 9-204. Security interests consequently
attach in several cases where the debtor does not have complete owner-
ship.
3. Value. After there is agreement and the debtor has rights in
the collateral, one still does not acquire or perfect a security interest
even where filing is accomplished unless "value is given"." In exam-
ining this issue in connection with purchase money transactions, one
must again distinguish those cases where the seller finances the pur-
chaser (with or without a subsequent assignment) from those cases
where the sale is financed by a stranger to the transaction. In the
latter category the Code is quite clear that a special kind of "value"
is required in purchase money transactions. The secured party must,
by making advances or incurring an obligation, give "value". This
provision is designed to require "present consideration" as a test 2 6
Even a security interest in newly acquired property in favor of a
non-seller will not be a purchase money security interest if taken
to secure an old debt. Something "new" must be added, and in ad-
dition, that new value must be expended in acquiring rights in the
collateral. Although the Comment to Section 9-107 makes explicit the
notion that time is introduced to the extent that fresh value is needed,
the section and the comment are equally unclear on the timing of the
24
 UCC §§ 9-204 and 9-303. Furthermore, UCC
	 1-201(37) defines a security
interest as "an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures an obligation".
(Emphasis supplied.)
25
 Comment 2 to UCC 9-107 and Comment 2 to UCC § 9-108.
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acquisition of the goods. When a non-seller finances the sale at the
outset, one can infer from the language of the section that the buyer
must acquire the goods after the value is given. The section speaks
in terms of giving value "to enable the debtor to acquire" the collateral.
There is a hint of prospective acquisition, although it would be far
better to read the section as permitting the introduction of the financ-
ing agency even after the debtor acquires rights in a sales law sense.
Some promptness should be demanded, but the purchase money cate-
gory will only be effective if the definition is interpreted in light of
the requirements of the transaction.
When the seller of the collateral is the original secured party, and
he takes or retains the security interest to secure all or part of its price,
the seller qualifies for the purchase money advantages. If the interest
secures more than the price of the goods, is it a purchase money se-
curity? Nothing in the Code suggests that such a security interest is
not a purchase money interest to the extent of the amount due as the
price. In fact, the introduction to Section 9-107 states that the se-
cured transaction qualifies "to the extent that it is . . . to secure all
or part of its price".
If such a security interest is created by the agreement of the seller
and buyer, and then the seller assigns his interest to a financer, the
security interest in the goods apparently still qualifies as a purchase
money interest.' Unlike prior law, the categorization occurs whether
the original seller-buyer arrangement is in the form of a chattel mort-
gage or a conditional sale." But are there any outside time limits on
the seller's taking a purchase money security interest?
We have seen that a question of proper timing may arise under
the definition where the original secured party is not the seller of the
collateral. The definition section would appear to permit the seller
to "take" his security interest either before, at, or after the time of
the sale. Thus, a seller could obtain a purchase money security interest
to secure the past due price of the collateral. Putting the matter in
another way, Section 9-107 literally permits a purchase money interest
in favor of a seller to secure the buyer's antecedent debt for the price.
At least two objections can be made to this interpretation. First,
Comment No. 2 to Section 9-108 states that although the Code does
not define the term "new value", the concept is illustrated in the
definition of purchase money security interest in Section 9-107, and
in other situations it is left to the courts to distinguish between "new"
and "old" value, between "present consideration" and "antecedent
debt". This comment reveals an intent to require fresh consideration
in all purchase money transactions.
26 Comment 1 to UCC § 9-107.
27 See note 18 supra and Comment to UCC 9-107.
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More significant from a practical viewpoint is the fact that any
secured seller in a case involving an obviously antecedent debt for the
price would not qualify for two of the major protections offered to
purchase money security. Under Section 9-301(2) the secured party
must file within ten days after collateral comes into possession of the
debtor, and under Section 9-312(4) a security interest in equipment
must be perfected when the debtor gets possession or within ten days
thereafter in order to qualify for the special purchase money protec-
tion. On the other hand, no similar time limit is placed upon the ad-
vantage accruing to certain purchase money transactions in permitting
perfection without filing.
B. Perfecting the Security Interest
Generally the Code permits the secured party to obtain the bene-
fits of a "perfected security interest" by taking possession of the
collateral or by filing." In most cases the secured party should not
plan to take an unperfected interest because it provides a secured
position of very low quality." In purchase money transactions involv-
ing certain consumer goods and farm equipment, the security interest
is perfected as soon as it attaches without any additional action by the
lender." In this way the Code, as a Uniform Act, adjusts to the law of
commercially important jurisdictions which traditionally have not re-
quired filing of conditional sales contracts.'
The exemption from the requirement of filing, even where the
debtor receives possession of the collateral, reflects a determination
that in these two areas public notoriety is not as useful as the private
credit information shared by business creditors both secured and un-
secured." In this light the 2,500 dollar limitation on farm equipment
28 UCC §§ 9-302 and 9-305. In transactions involving "proceeds": (§ 9-306) or
negotiable documents (§ 9-304), there is a limited automatic perfection without filing.
See text accompanying note 126 infra.
29 UCC § 9-301, and see text following note 72 infra.
3° UCC § 9-302(1)(c) and (d) and Comment 4. Oklahoma failed to enact the
exceptions for purchase money interests and, consequently, all such transactions will be
perfected by filing. Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Ohio limit auto-
matic perfection in farm equipment transactions to cases where the purchase price is
$500 rather than $2,500.
31 Comment 4 to UCC § 9-302. Both Illinois and Massachusetts generally per-
mitted conditional sales contracts to be perfected without filing under pre-Code law.
Sherer-Gillet Co. v. Long, 318 IA. 432, 149 N.E. 225 (1925) (based on Uniform Sales
Act §§ 20 and 23). Hoe v. Rex Mfg. Co., 205 Mass. 214, 91 N.E. 154 (1910); Nichols v.
Ashton, 155 Mass. 205, 29 N.E. 519 (1892); Barrett v. Pritchard, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.)
512 (1824).
22 The Code anticipates that one class of third parties should look to the filing rec-
ords for an indication of an outstanding security interest. Under UCC § 9-307(2) a
subsequent buyer for personal, family or household purposes, or for his own farming op-
erations will prevail over the perfected purchase money security interest unless the se-
cured party has filed. In Rhode Island UCC § 9-307(2) is modified to protect only
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financings exempted by Section 9-302(1)(c), and the implied re-
quirement that all interests in motor vehicles and fixtures must be
perfected by filing" can be rationalized. When the farmer buys ex-
pensive equipment or when any motor vehicle is financed, the public
notoriety becomes more significant.
The commercial desirability of making the public aware of the
outstanding property claims to a motor vehicle can be based upon the
highly mobile quality of the collateral as well as upon the ready mar-
ketability of used cars. 34 In the hands of a dishonest debtor the motor
vehicle has long been a source of frustration to secured lenders." Cer-
tificate of title laws have been enacted in a number of jurisdictions to
provide a special kind of publicity to the interests of third parties."
The certificate of title statutes, varying considerably in their re-
quirements, have been assimilated by Section 9-302(3). Subsection
(b) of that section is offered by the sponsors in alternate forms. Al-
ternative A is provided for those states where the certificate of title
law demands that any security interest must be noted on the certif-
icate." On the other hand, Alternative B is designed for those
jurisdictions where the security interest may be noted on the certifi-
cate." Even where the latter alternative provision is adopted, Section
9-302(4) makes the notation on the title certificate essential to ob-
taining a perfected security interest."
those subpurchasers who buy goods with an original price over $300. In Oklahoma the
subsection is entirely omitted; see note 30 supra.
88
 In Massachusetts a variation of the Code provision permits perfection of pur-
chase money security interests in motor vehicles without any filing. Mass. Gen. Laws
Ann. ch. 106, § 9-302 (1958). UCC § 9-302(3) and (4) preserves and enhances any
requirement of notation on a certificate under motor vehicle certificate of title laws.
There must be a filing with realty records under UCC § 9-401 in order to perfect an
interest in fixtures. See UCC § 9-313 for the special priority rules where fixtures are
involved.
84
 Leary, Horse and Buggy Lien Law and Migratory Automobiles, 96 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 455 (1948); Comment, 47 Calif. L. Rev. 543, 545 (1959).
85
 Kripke, The Modernization of Chattel Security Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 16 Law & Contemn. Prob. 183, 187 (1951) ; Commissioners' Prefatory Note, Uni-
form Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title and Anti-Theft Act, 9 Uniform Laws Ann. 235.
86 Forty jurisdictions now have some kind of certificate of title legislation. Comment,
70 Yale L.J. 995, 996 (1961). The only states there listed as not having such statutes
are: Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, New
Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont.
87
 Arkansas, Connecticut, Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and Wyoming have all adopted
Alternative A in UCC § 9-302. Ohio's numbering unfortunately does not follow the
Cade, and the provision appears as Section 1309.21(C) of the Ohio Revised Code.
Pennsylvania and Oregon followed Alternative B.
39
 Comment, 70 Yale L.J. 995, 999 (1961). Kentucky law has been unduly com-
plicated, since the requirement that the secured party must deliver the registration re-
ceipt of the owner for recordation of a "lien" in Ky. Rev. Stat. § 186.195 (Supp. 1961)
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A similar exemption from Code filing stems from Section 9-302
(3) (a), dealing with specialized centralized recording systems. These
exist at the federal level for security interests in specialized equipment
collateral, such as ships, aircraft, and certain motor vehicles held by
interstate carriers. In some of these federally regulated cases these
transactions are excluded from the Code;" in others only the Code
filing provisions are excluded;" and in a third class the federal law it-
self absorbs the Code terminology and filing system giving the Code
system a national effect.42
 As a practical matter, other interests in
consumer goods and equipment will be perfected by filing."
Apart from the delayed filing sanctioned by Sections 9-301(2)
and 9-312(4), there is little in the filing provisions of Article 9 which
has special impact upon purchase money transactions. In the farm
equipment and consumer goods transactions, filing under Section 9-401
(1) (a) will be at the local level, i.e., in the counties, cities, or towns.
In the business transactions involving equipment financing, filing will
be either entirely at the central office or at both a central and local
office," It is not recommended that the secured party claim an interest
in the proceeds in the financing statement, since in most cases resale
of collateral held primarily for use is not contemplated or authorized."
has been construed as being outside of UCC § 9-302. Consequently, both filing and the
notation are necessary for perfection. Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Queenan, 344
S.W.2d 383 (Ky. 1961).
4 ° UCC § 9-104 makes the Code inapplicable to "a security interest subject to any
statute of the United States such as the Ship Mortgage Act, 1920, to the extent that
such statutes govern the rights of parties to and third parties affected by transactions in
particular types of property."
41 UCC § 4-302 (3) (a). The Code could continue to fill the gaps left in assaying
the rights of third parties under such statutes as 24 Stat. 386 (1887), as amended, 49
U.S.C. § 20 (1958) (railroad rolling stock) and 72 Stat. 772 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1403
(1958) (aircraft), providing for federal filing of security interests. Even the Ship Mort-
gage Act, 41 Stat, 1000 (1920), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 911-84 (1958), may have such
gaps. Equipment trusts covering railway rolling stock are excluded from the Code.
UCC § 9-104(e).
42 72 Stat. 812 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 313 (1958). Perfection of security interests in
any of the covered motor trucks or buses owned by carriers certificated by the Inter-
state Commerce Commission may be by use of the certificate of title or by the record-
ing system of the debtor's home state. See UCC § 9-103 (chief place of business).
Perfection here is good only against general creditors and subsequent third parties.
Comment, 67 Vale L.J. 1024 (1958).
43 Filing is still the most appropriate means of perfection, although it is literally
possible that interests in such goods may be perfected by the use of documents under
UCC § 9-304 or by the provisions as to proceeds in UCC § 9-306, or under a seller's
security interest arising under Article 2 and perfected by operation of UCC § 9-113.
Hogan, The Marriage of Sale to Chattel Security in the Uniform Commercial Code:
Massachusetts Variety, 38 B.U.L. Rev. 571, 575-89 (1958).
44 See Coogan, Public Notice Under the Uniform Commercial Code and Other Re-
cent Chattel Security Laws, Including "Notice Filing", 47 Iowa L. Rev. 289 (1962).
41, In fact if proceeds are claimed, the secured party might find the statement used
as evidence of a liberty of sale by the debtor.
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C. Third Party Risks
1. Other Secured Parties. Much of the discussion of Article 9
focuses upon the Code rules giving vitality to after-acquired property
agreements through notice filing," the "first-to-file" rule of priority,'
and the abolition of the legal basis for Benedict v. Ratner." These
provisions have their principal impact upon inventory and accounts
receivable transactions." Traditionally, purchase money equipment
financing has had few of the problems associated with inventory fi-
nancing. The purchaser of equipment buys for use and not for resale.
The collateral is clearly identified and ascertained and not a shifting
stock of goods. The debt is specific, since no future advances are in-
volved. New instruments can be practicably executed if new property
is acquired.
The after-acquired property approach of the Code thus mainly
concerns the sales financer of equipment or consumer goods defen-
sively, rather than offensively. In other words, the Code will not add
much to his arsenal of techniques for obtaining security; rather, it
poses the threat that the financed collateral will be subjected to a
claim of another financer under an after-acquired property agreement
with the debtor."
The Code itself rather carefully provides the purchase money
consumer goods or equipment financer with protection against the
possible dangers of a monopolistic "floating lien" and against the loss
of the collateral to the holder of a subsequent security agreement made
under a prior filing." Section 9-312(4) gives priority over any con-
flicting security interest in the same collateral if the purchase money
security interest is perfected at the time the debtor received possession
of the collateral or within ten days thereafter." Three elements are
crucial to this special priority: (1) the conflicting claim must be in the
same collateral; (2) the purchase money interest must be perfected
within the allotted period; and (3) the period of grace ends ten days
after the debtor-buyer receives "possession" of the goods.
44 UCC §§ 9-108, 9-204 and 9-402.
47 UCC § 9-312(5).
48
 268 U.S. 353 (1925) ; UCC § 9-205.
49
 See Coogan, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Priorities Among Se-
cured Creditors and the "Floating Lien," 72 Harv. L. Rev. 838, 850-55 (1958).
" Of course the Code does relieve the purchase money financer of technical distinc-
tions between chattel mortgages and conditional sales which formerly often Ied to the
loss of the entire security. Gilmore and Axelrod, Chattel Security: I, 57 Yale L.J. 517,
541-43 (1948).
51 In addition, if the purchase money financer uses the pledge technique, he will
perfect by taking possession (UCC § 9-304) and will prevail under the first-to-perfect
rule notwithstanding an earlier filing.
12 The ten day grace period is also present in determining the rights of lien
creditors. UCC § 9-301(2). Compare text accompanying note 72 infra.
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In the excepted farm equipment and consumer transactions, per-
fection will occur without filing as soon as the security interest has
attached, i.e., when there is an agreement, value has been given, and
the debtor has rights in the collateral:" In most other Code-covered
equipment transactions, perfection will not occur until the appropriate
filing has been accomplished." Also important here is the fact that
perfection cannot occur until the interest has attached. 55
Ideally, the purchase money financer should be certain that the
transaction is timed as follows:
(1) Filing of a notice or preferably the contract (Section
9-40 1 ) ;
(2) Security Agreement; and
(3) Sale and delivery of the goods.
If the transaction is thus arranged, the security interest will both
attach and be perfected no later than the time the buyer takes delivery
of the goods. Where the financer deals directly with the buyer, value
may be given by the secured party's appropriately conditioned prom-
ise to make the advance in step number two so that perfection
could occur even before the advance was made." Furthermore, by
filing initially the financer wins not only the purchase money protec-
tion, but also the advantage of early filing under the first-to-file rule. 57
Obviously, there are many transactions which simply cannot be
so timed. The sales financing questions may arise after the sale and
delivery, or the security agreement may be in the sales contract itself.
In 1958 changes were made in this subsection and in Section 9-301(2)
in recognition of the fact that filing frequently occurs only after
delivery in non-inventory financing. 58
 In this event the financer can
still obtain priority if he delays filing, or any one of the other require-
ments for perfection, until some time within ten days after the debtor
gets possession of the goods. This priority is effective even though
the purchase money financer knows of the prior filing." In the non-
seller related deal, care must still be taken to assure that the "value"
is not so antecedent that it disqualifies the lender from being a pur-
chase money security holder.
The time at which the debtor receives possession starts the run-
TJCC §§ 9-204 and 9-302.
54 In addition to perfection through motor vehicle certificates of title, it is also
possible that perfection can be accomplished by other means; see note 43 supra.
55 UCC § 9-303(1).
UCC § 1-201(44).
57 UCC § 9-312(5). The 1958 Amendments make this result clear. Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 1958 Supplement to the Official Text, 17.
58 Sec Coogan, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Priorities Among Se-
cured Creditors and the "Floating Lien," 72 Harv. L. Rev. 838, 861-63 (1958).
59 Comment 3 to UCC § 9-312.
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ning of the ten day grace period for perfection. Problems will un-
doubtedly arise as to when the debtor "receives possession" of the
collateral. The Code does not offer a specific definition of the term,
but there are indications that actual delivery to the buyer or to a third
party is crucial.°° It is important to realize that this priority rule turns
on the more easily ascertained time of receipt of possession and not
upon the time the debtor obtains "rights" in the collateral.
As a result of this special priority, there is usually no real need
to search filing records if you are a purchase money financer of con-
sumer goods or equipment. With one exception, whether the lender is
a seller or a third party, he will be able to prevail against any other
secured creditors claiming the collateral so long as he perfects within
the permitted time.
The exception to this notion comes from the possibility that, under
the Code, a purchase money position will be claimed by two parties.
The supplier may retain a purchase money interest for seventy-five
per cent of the price, and another financer (even an after-acquired
property holder) may supply the down payment. Both could qualify
technically for the purchase money position, and both or neither could
qualify for the special priority under Section 9-312(4). If the value
of the collateral is not sufficient to satisfy both claims on default,
who prevails? Who will be given priority? Since there is no solution
to the problem in the special priority rule, one would be forced to
look to Section 9-312(5), the first-to-file, first-to-perfect, or first-to-
attach rules. Where neither purchase money claimant has qualified
for the Section 9-312(4) priority because of a failure to perfect on
time, the language of Section 9-312(5) now clearly indicates that these
general priority provisions prevail."
Where both qualify for the priority by perfecting within the
permitted time, the language is not so clear. Section 9-312(5)
commences:
In all cases not governed by other rules stated in this section
(including cases of purchase money security interests which
do not qualify for the special priorities set forth in subsec-
tions (3) and (4) of this section), priority between conflict-
ing security interests in the same collateral shall be deter-
mined as follows . . . .
The quoted parenthetical language in the preamble of Section
9-312(5) may be interpreted as excluding the case where two pur-
chase money security interests both qualify for the priority under
60
 UCC § 1-201(14) defines "delivery" only partially in that it omits goods. UCC
§ 2-103(1)(c) defines "receipt" at least for sales law purposes.
61 See note 57 supra.
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Section 9-312(4). This could result in the court's looking outside the
Code to case law for the resolution of any such conflict.' The financer
who retained title to the property would have an excellent position
under most of the earlier conditional sales cases." On the other hand,
the court might feel compelled to develop new case rules in light of
the Code provisions. In this way a court could revive the earlier Code
idea of a pro rata sharing between two conflicting purchase money
security interests.04
 However, it was apparently the intention of the
draftsmen to make subsection (5) a catchall provision; and the pro-
vision and the general priority rules probably control even here, since
these do provide a workable set of rules.
The following courses of conduct seem possible solutions to the
difficulties presented by the situation of two or more conflicting pur-
chase money security interests in equipment, where filing is a pre-
requisite to perfection.
I. S sells the goods to B and remains in possession of the goods
under circumstances whereby a security interest in the goods arises
under Article 2. No writing or filing is thus required to perfect the
interest.' S then files a notice or the signed agreement itself prior
to delivering the goods to B.
If TP (another purchase money security holder) has filed, S can
check the record and then refuse to deliver the goods. If S does not
check the record or decides to deliver the goods, he may still claim
that his Article 2 security interest comes ahead of the third party's
claim because perfection of A's interest occurred at the time of the
sale and remains continuously perfected through the filing." S can
claim perfection from the earliest possible moment, i.e., the time when
the debtor first obtained rights in the collateral. S can thus claim
priority under the first-to-perfect rule." One risk still remains where
S does not check the record on filing. The third party may have so
arranged his transaction that his security interest was also perfected
upon the debtor's acquiring rights in the collateral. Here it seems
62
 UCC § 1-103 provides that unless "displaced by the particular provisions of this
Act" all supplemental bodies of law continue to apply. At least one court has shown
a remarkable willingness to flee the Code for the safety of the prior law. See In re
Kravitz, 278 F.2d 820 (3rd Cir. 1960).
63
 Even when liens on after-acquired property are permitted, the theory seems to be
that the lien falls on the debtor's interest as acquired. Thus the conditional seller pre-
vails. Hunter v. Scruggs Drug Store, Inc., 113 F.2d 971 (4th Cir. 1940). Compare
Central Chandelier Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 259 N.Y. 343, 182 N.E. 10 (1932) (unified
conditional sales contract).
64 See text accompanying note 72 infra.
UCC § 9-113. See Hogan, The Marriage of Sales to Chattel Security in the
Uniform Commercial Code: Massachusetts Variety, 38 B.U.L. Rev. 571, .585 (1958);
Comment, 68 Yale L.J. 751 (1959).
66 UCC §§ 9-303 and 9-312(6).
67 UCC § 9-312(5)(b).
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that a court would be forced to leave the Code. If precedent is to be
the guide, the fact that the buyer acquired the property burdened
with the seller's claim would make for a priority in the seller under
the traditional title analysis." Section 9-202, making title irrelevant
in interpreting the Code provisions, would not bar this approach here,
since the Code can be said to have no provision. All in all, the wise
seller will check the record.
Analyzing the Code further on these same facts, with only the
addition of a later filing by TP within the ten day period of Section
9-312(4), we can isolate another troublesome question. Both security
interests will qualify for Section 9-312(4) priority. If the risk is
significant, both parties should check the record after the expiration
of the ten day grace period, and if another purchase money security
interest is present, both loans should be called. Where this kind of
checking is impractical or calling the loan is inappropriate, the seller
can assert that the previously described Article 2 security interest
makes his claim the first-to-be-perfected or that S is entitled to pre-
cedence under the first-to-file rule in any event.
II. S sells and delivers the goods, filing thereafter, but before
the end of the ten day period. If no other purchase money interest is
then filed, S will probably be able to take advantage of the first-to-file
rule of Section 9-312(5) even where TP files within the ten day grace
period. S's risk here is only the very unlikely possibility that another
purchase money lender has perfected prior to the filing by taking
possession of the collateral after the delivery to B. On the other hand,
if TP's claim will be given priority under the first-to-file rule, S's only
argument will then be that Section 9-312(5) does not apply; and since
S sold on a title retained basis, he should be given priority.
III. If S does not remain in possession before filing and does not
file within the ten day period, Section 9-312(4) clearly seems to
indicate that TP wins if TP perfects within the ten day period.
IV. If S sells, does not remain in possession before filing, and
both S and TP fail to file within ten days, then neither qualifies for
the Section 9-312(4) priority, and the first-to-file would take pre-
cedence. In the unlikely event that neither ever files, the first to take
possession would be the first to perfect, and he would thus prevail.
Otherwise, the matter will be resolved on the question of whose in-
terest first attached. This issue can again involve the previously dis-
cussed question of simultaneous attaching and the traditions protecting
a conditional seller.
The third party financer contemplating an advance to enable the
debtor to obtain the collateral can contribute to the avoidance of these
kinds of conflicts by becoming aware of the identity of the seller
68
 See cases cited note 63 supra.
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and checking on his extension of credit. Even this will not entirely
eliminate the chance of these disputes, since the entire series of facts
can involve two or more purchase money financers who are not sellers."
If practicable, a TP financer could also withhold making the actual
advance until after the ten day period expired. In that event a security
interest could attach and be perfected before the ten day period, but
TP would be able to rescind any contract with a covenant against
other encumbrances if another purchase money interest was filed.
The security interest would attach and be perfected earlier because
value can be given by the contingent promise to make the advance.
More difficult questions arise where the conflicting purchase
money security interests can be perfected without filing as is the case
in certain transactions involving consumer goods or farm equipment
having a price not in excess of 2,500 dollars. 7° Again, if only one of
the interests qualifies for the special priority under Section 9-312(4),
that interest will prevail. Where both interests so qualify, we are
again confronted with the applicability of Section 9-312(5). 7' It is
clear that this general priority rule applies where neither interest
qualifies for this special rule. Assuming that general rule controls in
either case, since neither interest is perfected by filing, the first-to-
perfect rule will control. This results in the seller-financer getting
a more advantageous position because of the fact that his Article
2 interest may be perfected first and because of the tradition protect-
ing the conditional seller under the theory of title. Actually, there is
no way for the competing financer to avoid this problem other than
by consulting with the seller prior to making the advance. All in all,
it is to be regretted that the Code draftsmen have eliminated Section
9-312(5) of the prior draft of the Code. That section provided:
"When there are conflicting purchase money security interests, the
interest of a seller or of a secured party whose advance was used
at his direction to pay a seller takes priority if he has perfected his
interest at the time the debtor receives the collateral or within ten days
thereafter. In any other case of conflicting purchase money security
interests they rank equally". 72
2. Lien Creditors, Bulk Transferees and Buyers Not in Or-
dinary Course of Business. A ten day grace period similar to that
provided in priority rules for collateral other than inventory is given
to all purchase money financers in Section 9-301(2). Again, the ten
day period commences when the collateral "comes into possession of
the debtor". Although somewhat different language is used in Section
60 UCC § 9-107(b).
70 UCC § 9-302.
71 See text accompanying note 58 supra.
72 UCC § 9-312(5), Uniform Commercial Code, Text and Comments Edition
(Official Draft 1952).
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9-312(4), where the ten day period is measured when the debtor
"receives possession", the two sections apparently permit the same
grace period.
A test different from the perfection concept of the priority rule
is employed for asserting the protection under Section 9-301(2);
filing within the ten day grace period is necessary. Since a perfected
security interest prevails over lien creditors in any case (not involving
fraud or a fraudulent conveyance), the grace period here is only
necessary for those cases where perfection occurs solely by filing. On
the other hand, Section 9-312(4) deals with disputes between secured
creditors which could involve disputes between interests not perfected
by filing like the farm equipment and consumer goods transactions
exempted under Section 9-302. As was the case under Section 5 of
the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, the lien creditor or transferee in
bulk loses to the purchase money party in any event where the trans-
fer or lien attaches prior to a timely filing. Of course, neither a prior
filing nor filing within the ten day period can cut off the rights of a
lien creditor or transferee which arose before the security interest
attached, i.e., before the secured party had any interest in the col-
lateral. When the filing is not timely, i.e., delayed beyond the ten
day period, the purchase money security interest is nonetheless
perfected and will be entitled to precedence over a subsequent lien
creditor." Although the Code contains no provisions specifically giving
any perfected security interest rights superior to a subsequent lien
creditor, the same effect is reached by Section 9-201. That section
makes any security agreement effective according to its terms between
the parties, against purchasers of the collateral, and against creditors
except where the Code otherwise provides. In Section 9-301(1), the
Code has "otherwise provided", and the unperfected security interest
is made subordinate to the rights of several classes of third parties,
including a lien creditor.
UCC § 9-301(1) thus rejects the notion that a chattel mortgage unfiled beyond
a reasonable time is not valid against creditors who extended credit prior to the filing,
even though such creditors obtain no lien until after filing. Karst v. Gan; 136 N.Y.
316, 32 N.E. 1073 (1893). The New York chattel mortgage statute has recently been
amended to allow a ten day delay, but it is not certain that the rule of Karst v. Gane
would not still apply where filing is delayed more than ten days. N.Y. Lien Law § 230.
Compare N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 65 as to conditional sales. The bankruptcy impact of
the Code rule is ably discussed in Kennedy, The Trustee in Bankruptcy Under the Uni-
form Commercial Code: Some Problems Suggested by Articles 2 and 9, 14 Rutgers L.
Rev. 518, 527-29 (1960). Perfection by filing within the ten day period even where
bankruptcy has intervened will be effective against the trustee under Bankruptcy Act
§ 60(a)(7). On the other hand, a delay of eleven days will be perilous in such a case.
A delay in filing with an intervening bankruptcy could bring Sections 70(c) and (e)
of the Bankruptcy Act into play; but timely filing would still result in the secured
party's obtaining a perfected interest under the grace period provided by state law.
The "strong-arm" clause of section 70(c) lost much of its muscle in Lewis v. Manu-
facturers National Bank, 364 U.S. 603 (1960).
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Except for the purchase money rule of subsection (2), in the event
•	 of non-perfection all security holders risk losing the collateral to:
(1) Secured creditors under Section 9-312.
(2) Lien creditors without knowledge of the security interest
and who obtain liens before perfection of the security
interest.
(3) Transferees in bulk to the extent that they give value
and receive delivery without knowledge of the security
interest and before it is perfected.
(4) Buyers not in the ordinary course of business to the
extent that they give value and receive delivery without
knowledge of the security interest and before it is per-
fected.
Secured creditors are explicitly precluded from claiming rights under
groups (3) and (4)."
Clearly, the special ten day rule for purchase money trans-
actions in subsection (2) of Section 9-301 excepts from the classes
who take priority over an unperfected security interest only groups
(2) and (3). Thus, it appears that a seller retaining a purchase money
interest and relying on the ten day grace period in Section 9-301(2),
still has the risk that he will lose the collateral to an intervening "buyer
not in ordinary course". For example, a seller of a bulldozer who
obtains a signed security agreement from the buyer-contractor and
who delivers the collateral to a contractor will apparently lose to a
subpurchaser who without knowledge gives value and takes delivery
from the contractor prior to a delayed filing within the ten day period.
The risk is not lessened by reason of the knowledge requirement, since
the secured party would have to show that such a purchaser had actual
knowledge, and not merely reason to know, of the security interest.
Nor does the "value" requirement help the secured party substantially,
since value is broadly defined in Section 1-201(44).
If the secured party wishes to avoid this risk, he must file before
delivery to the buyer. The risk can be minimized by filing as promptly
as possible after delivery. This risk, added to the priority problem
arising from the possibility of two purchase money security interests,
should lead the purchase money security lender to file as soon as pos-
sible and preferably before delivery of the collateral.
3. Subsequent Buyers of Consumer Goods or Equipment. The
preceding section was concerned in part with the effectiveness of an un-
perfected security interest against two kinds of purchasers, the buyer
not in ordinary course of business and the transferee in bulk. Now
74 UCC § 9-301(1)(c).
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we turn to the rights of a buyer in ordinary course of business against
a perfected security interest. Section 9-307(1) protects such a buyer
where the security interest is perfected, even though the buyer knows
of its existence. The definition of this kind of buyer in Section 1-201
(9) limits the protected group to those buying in ordinary course from
a person "in the business of selling goods of that kind". The usual
case will involve not equipment or consumer goods, but inventory.
Comment No. 2 to Section 9-307 indicates that the only case where
subsection (1) can apply is where the collateral is inventory. In some
situations, however, it is conceivable that the debtor in possession of
equipment subject to a perfected security interest may regularly sell
the collateral." Hence, an otherwise qualified buyer from such a seller
can be classified literally as a buyer in ordinary course. Some buyers
who do not qualify for protection as buyers in ordinary course may
nonetheless prevail under Section 9-307(2). Since holders of purchase
money security interests in certain consumer goods and farm equip-
ment are not required to file to perfect their security interests, a sub-
sequent purchaser from the possessor of such collateral has no means of
learning of the prior security interest. To offer some measure of
protection to such purchasers, the Code provides that unless the
secured party files, the innocent purchaser for value who buys such
collateral for his personal, family, or household purposes, or for his
own farming operations, prevails (no grace period). In counselling
the secured party in this context, one must assess the risk of losing
to such a purchaser against the economics and efficiency inherent in
perfection without filing. It should also be noted that under sub-
section (2) the second purchaser must be without knowledge of
the security interest. Further, since the subsection is limited to con-
sumer goods and farm equipment, it has no application to situations
where the debtor originally holds the collateral for sale. That matter
is governed entirely by subsection (1), despite the fact that the two
subsections are not explicitly made exclusive alternatives.
Where the collateral is such that filing must be made in order to
perfect the security interest, then of course a failure to file will mean
that the secured party loses in any contest with the kind of buyer
covered by Section 9-307(2) or by Section 9-301. Thus, any purchase
money security interest in fixtures must be filed in order to protect the
secured party, since subsection (2) explicitly excepts fixtures from
its operation." Similarly, although motor vehicles are not mentioned
in Section 9-307(2), in any purchase money transaction involving a
motor vehicle required to be licensed, which qualifies as consumer
goods or farm equipment, filing is required for perfection." Here,
76 Comment 3 to UCC § 9-109 states that such collateral remains equipment.
76 Comment 2 to UCC § 9-307 makes it clear that the parenthetical exception of
fixtures refers to both the farm equipment and consumer goods transactions.
77 UCC § 9-302(1)(c) and (d).
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failure to file will result in non-perfection, and the consequent risk of
loss of the collateral to the subpurchasers covered by Sections 9-301
and 9-307(2). One major exception to the need for a Code financing
statement is important in this connection. Sections 9-302(3) and (4)
provide that the filing provisions of the Code do not apply to a security
interest subject to a federal registration or filing statute, or to a statute
of the Code state which provides for central filing or for certificates of
title. Perfection in such instances can only be accomplished through com-
plying with the special federal or state statute." What effect does this
exception to Code filing have upon the requirement in Section 9-307(2)
that even where there is a perfected security interest the secured party
must have "filed a financing statement covering such goods" or he risks
the loss of his security to the protected purchasers? If the secured
party fails to file a Code financing statement but does perfect under
the special federal or state statute under Section 9-302(4), does the
secured party run the risk of losing to the purchasers protected by
Section 9-307(2)? Although Comment No. 3 to Section 9-307 indicates
a negative answer, the language of the statute is not completely clear.
Section 9-307(2) suggests that a financing statement must be filed to
avoid the risk, but Section 9-302(3) indicates that the filing pro-
visions of Article 9, in which Section 9-307(2) may be grouped, do
not apply to transactions subject to the special statutes. It is upon the
latter point that the comment relies, and this seems sound. Otherwise,
a secured party could be misled into failing to file a Code statement
by Section 9-302. Furthermore, in this group of cases the purchasing
class safeguarded by Section 9-307(2) does have a source for checking
the seller's title to the goods. This is all that Section 9-307(2) really
offers such purchasers.
III. FINANCING THE PURCHASE OF INVENTORY
A. Introduction
Under the non-Code law the financer of newly acquired inventory
has potentially available to him the entire list of security devices. To
effectuate his desire to become a secured creditor, he may choose in
many jurisdictions to use the pledge (usually in the form of a docu-
mentary arrangement), the chattel mortgage (floor-plan statutes), the
conditional sale, the trust receipt, or the factor's lien. In many situ-
ations the appropriate arrangement may involve a combination of
two or more of these techniques. The Code's greatest contribution here
is that selecting the wrong device will no longer result in an automatic
loss of the security. Further, the advantages associated with purchase
78 UCC § 9-302(4). See text following note 36 supra.
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money financing may flow to the secured party irrespective of the
technical form of device."
As noted earlier, Section 9-107 permits either the seller or a third
party to qualify for the purchase money advantages. Further, the
Code extends the concept of notice filing, i.e., the filing of a single
simple statement, to all the various security transactions. More will
be said shortly about this aspect of the problem. Inventory financing
may involve collateral which is specific and identifiable, e.g., cars
held for sale, refrigerators, and other appliances; or it may involve
collateral which is simply incapable of such identification. In the
latter category must be grouped small parts, work in process, and
most raw materials. Each of these classes will be considered separately,
since each involves distinctly different problems.
B. Specific and Easily Identified Inventory Collateral
1. Creating the Security Interest. In non-Code law, where the
secured creditor supplies funds for the acquisition of readily identified
inventory, he will usually investigate the relative merits of using the
conditional sales or trust receipt pattern. Under the prior Uniform
Acts governing each of these devices, a purchase money transaction is
essential." In some cases a chattel mortgage could be employed but
as noted earlier, the chattel mortgage was rarely differentiated as a
distinctly purchase money device. 8 '
Where the secured party is presently financing readily identifiable
collateral under a chattel mortgage, conditional sale, or a trust receipt
plan, the Code will permit him to continue substantially the same
business pattern." In addition, the Code will eliminate several legal
obstacles to the successful use of the pattern.
No longer will the conditional sale be subject to a declaration of
invalidity because the buyer owned the goods at the outset." In fact,
even the special benefits of purchase money financing will extend to
such a financer under the definition of Section 9-107. For the same
79
 These primary advantages are catalogued in UCC §§ 9-301, 9-302, and 9-312.
90
 See Kripke, Inventory Financing of Hard Goods, 1956 Ill. L.F. 580, 587, where
it is pointed out that Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Nevada, Oregon, and
Wisconsin do not limit the trust receipt to purchase money transactions and that Cali-
fornia and Tennessee permit the device to be used in non-purchase money transactions
involving specific collateral. N.Y. Lien Law § 230-c provides a means of employing a
chattel mortgage with central notice filing as a supplement to the trust receipts act.
81 See note 18 supra.
82
 Two cautions are in order. The Code newly requires notices to other secured
parties under UCC § 9-312(3). UCC § 9-301(2) protects the unfiled interest against
lien creditors for only ten days, while Section 8 of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act
provides for twenty-one days. UCC § 9-304 provides a twenty-one day period for
negotiable documents and instruments.
83
 For example, Hughbanks, Inc. v. Gourley, 12 Wash,2d 44, 120 P.2d 523 (1941),
Annot., 138 A.L.R. 664 and cases cited in Annot., 175 A.L.R. 1366, 1378. See Bogert,
Commentaries on Conditional Sales, 2A Uniform Laws Ann. 12.
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reason, a non-selling chattel mortgagee may claim purchase money
status.
In the trust receipt transaction governed by the common law or
The Uniform Trust Receipts Act (UTRA), a tripartite arrangement
is required. The seller and the buyer of goods must be joined by a
third party financer." Where the common law alone governs the
transaction, it is also necessary to assure that the flow of title is from
the seller to the financer and does not first pass to the buyer.' In
fact, there is some case authority for the proposition that the trust
receipt can never be classified as an independent device." Finally,
not only does UTRA require that the trust receipt may only be utilized
in purchase money transactions, but it further limits the use of the
device to inventory type transactions." In the present law a failure to
meet any one of these requirements results in the risk of losing all
the collateral to any third party. The Code removes all of these pitfalls
for the unwary secured creditor.
Under the Code, the fact that the transaction is non-purchase
money or is not an inventory financing device will not necessarily lead
to the loss of the security. Whether the trust receipt, conditional sale,
or chattel mortgage form is used, the security interest will be effective
notwithstanding the fact that the agreement covers only previously
owned assets. On the other hand, if the security interest does qualify
as a purchase money interest, then the Code gives special qualities to
that security interest in connection with filing and priorities."
Nonetheless, even under the Code the careless secured creditor
may still find that he risks losing all of the inventory collateral because
he has delayed filing in the erroneous belief that he holds a purchase
money security interest, or because he does not qualify for the pur-
chase money priority rule in Section 9-312(3). As in the case of
equipment or consumer goods financing, the secured party who is not
a seller should be certain" that the form of the agreement reveals that the
value is given to "enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of
collateral"" and he should be certain that the value is in fact so used."
84 Uniform Trust Receipts Act § I. See B-W Acceptance Corp. v. Colley, 256 F.2d
937 (10th Cir. 1958). In some states this rule is modified; see note 80 supra.
85 Commissioners' Prefatory Note, Uniform Trust Receipts Act, 9C Uniform Laws
Ann. 222.
86 GM.A.C. v. Whiteley, 217 Iowa 998, 252 N.W. 779 (1934) (classified as con-
ditional sale) ; Industrial Finance Corp. v. Cappelman, 284 Fed. 8 (4th Cir. 1922) (classi-
fied as "in the nature of a chattel mortgage" under South Carolina law). See also
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-11 (1953) (trust receipt equated with chattel mortgage).
87 Uniform Trust Receipts Act § 2(3).
88 UCC §§ 9-301 and 9-312(3). UCC § 9-302 does not excuse filing in inventory
financing solely because purchase money is involved.
so UCC 9-107.
90 See text following note 18 supra.
91 This may involve some "policing" by the secured party despite the abolition by
UCC I 9-205 of the fraud-in-law rule based on dominion.
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Both in the case of selling and non-selling financers, the section is
somewhat obscure as to the relative timing of the acquisition of the
goods and the giving of value. As noted earlier, subsection (1) literally
seems to permit a seller to qualify as a purchase money holder even
though he takes a security interest long after delivery of the goods »z
This is clearly contrary to the concept that purchase money security
interests are to be preferred because they facilitate the flow of goods
or because they bring in a special kind of new asset. On the other
hand, subsection (2) dealing with non-sellers can be literally read as
being excessively restrictive. Does the phraseology "to acquire"
demand that the financing arrangement must occur before the debtor
gets any rights in the collateral? It should not be so read because the
section could then exclude from the protected group a bank which
comes into the transaction after the buyer and seller proceeded so far
in their arrangements that the goods are "identified". Clearly, in
substance, the bank in this case is financing the acquisition of the
goods even though the buyer has some rights in the collateral. A sub-
stantially similar problem is now present in trust receipt law. Under
UTRA Section 2 (1) (a), the entruster must, prior to the transaction,
have or "acquire promptly" a security interest in the goods. This pro-
vision was designed to assure that the trust receipt was used only in
the "purchase money situation". Perhaps the courts will look to the
few cases under that section in connection with the meaning of "prompt-
ly", and this would permit security interests to qualify as purchase
money even though at the time the arrangement is made the buyer
holds some rights to the goods." One caution must be raised in using
trust receipt precedent, since the Code clearly does not and UTRA
does require a tripartite transaction. What should be required is a
substantially simultaneous acquisition of rights to the goods by the
buyer, a creation of the security interest to secure the advance by the
secured party, and payment by the buyer of the price to the seller.
Apart from the timing question, the purchase money financer of
readily identified inventory should be certain that the description of
the collateral is so specific that no doubt will arise as to the collateral
covered. This is essential to an intelligent use of the Code's special
priority for purchase money inventory financing. Of course, Section 9-
110 only requires that the description reasonably identify the collat-
eral; but this rule relates to the validity of the security interest and
will not aid the secured party to determine which ten of fifty different
112
 ITC § 9-107; see text following note 27 supra.
B-W Acceptance Corp. v. Benjamin T. Crump Co., 199 Va. 312, 99 S.E.2d 606
(1957); In re San Clemente Eke. Supply Co., 101 F. Supp. 252 (S.D. Calif. 1951); In re
Chappell, 77 F. Supp. 573, 576 (D. Ore. 1948). Compare Assoc. Discount Corp. v. Slay-
ton, 85 So.2d 199 (Miss. 1956) (one day delay after purchase by dealer, issue not dis-
cussed).
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refrigerators come within his agreement. This is another reason for
continuing the pattern of financing now in existence. Although the
Code rules relax many of the rigid requirements of the prior law,
voluntarily complying with many of those requirements where it is
feasible and practicable will often aid the secured party. Consequently,
where under non-Code law a power of attorney was furnished by a
dealer to the financer for the execution of individual notes and trust
receipts, that practice can well be continued under the Code even
though a single agreement can be legally substituted. If the old format
is used, it will be clear that, by this advance, this secured party
enabled this debtor to acquire this particular collateral. At least if
the trust receipt pattern is abandoned under the Code, some docu-
mentary substitute must be devised for such an identification of lender,
purchase price, and collateral.
The same point should be considered in connection with the fact
that Section 9-205 abolishes the so-called prohibition on free-handed
mortgages. The Code does not require as a matter of law that the
secured party must police the collateral and its proceeds. The fact
remains that if the secured party does not exercise some control, he
runs the business risk that the debtor will dissipate the collateral.
Thus, some form of policing provision may still be desirable in the
agreement.
2. Perfecting the Security Interest. Suggesting a specific de-
scription of the collateral in the security agreement does not neces-
sarily lead to the same demand in the financing statement in inventory
financing. The Code explicitly permits the secured party to file a
simple notice of financing "indicating the types, or describing the items
of collateral" 94
 The secured party may comply with the Code by
indicating much Tess than would be required of him under most non-
Code chattel mortgage or conditional sales law. Again, however, if
specific collateral is being acquired (and this is true even though a
number of acquisitions are involved), the description in the financing
statement should not be broadly written. General statements such as
"inventory wherever located" should not be used unless it is certain
that the secured party is financing the acquisition of all the debtor's
inventory. If the dealer has stock other than the collateral financed,
the secured party's subsequent disputes will be more easily resolved
if the financing statement is explicitly limited to the particular stock
acquired. Thus, if a dealer in appliances purchases several brands of
refrigerators, a financing statement should at least indicate the brand
of inventory being financed."
94 UCC § 9-402.
95
 Another incentive to particularized descriptions of the collateral is that in the
absence of the most specific description, the secured party may be called upon to amend
the statement under UCC § 9-402(4).
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As a starting point, one may anticipate that usually the purchase
money security interest in readily identifiable collateral will be per-
fected by filing. Perfection by taking possession of the collateral"
or through perfection of an interest in documents"' is available, but
filing is the most effective means of perfecting an interest in such
goods." The details of filing practices differ little from those covering
any business financing.'" As elsewhere, the Code adopts the notice
filing concept of TJTRA. 10° Consequently, since the trust receipt was
the device best adapted to this kind of collateral, there will be little
change in the filing practices developed under that statute. Unlike
equipment transactions, the secured party should here be certain that
an interest in proceeds is claimed in the financing statement, since a
resale of inventory to a buyer in the ordinary course of business will
mean the loss of the interest in the specific goods."'
3. Third Party Risks.
(a) Other Secured Parties (Other Than Those Claiming
Through Documents).
Although a secured party has a security interest which has at-
tached to readily identifiable collateral and has been perfected by
filing, there is still the possibility that he may lose this collateral to
a third party financer. In the absence of a special rule, the Code gen-
erally provides for priority among competing secured parties on the
basis of first-to-file, first-to-perfect, or first-to-attach.'" A special
conditional exception is provided for purchase money security interests
in Section 9-312(3). The quality of the purchase money security
interest obtained will thus depend upon whether the secured party
has taken the steps called for in Section 9-312(3). Upon the fulfill-
ment of these steps the secured party gets the major benefit of quali-
fying as a purchase money financer of inventory, i.e., priority over
a conflicting security interest in the same collateral. Such a financer
can also defeat a claim made under an after-acquired property clause
in an earlier filed non-purchase money security agreement. We can
now examine each of the required steps.
06 UCC § 9-305.
tir UCC § 9-304.
99 See text accompanying note 127 infra.
99 See Coogan, Public Notice Under the Uniform Commercial Code and Other Re-
cent Chattel Security Laws, Including "Notice Filing", 47 Iowa L. Rev. 289 (1962).
100 Uniform Trust Receipts Act § 13. Both provide for central office filing, but
UCC § 9-401(c) (option) may call for two filings in business financings.
101 UCC §§ 9-306 and 9-307. For a good discussion of the improvements made in
current law by the Code, see Kripke, Inventory Financing of Hard Goods, 1956 Ill.
L.F. 580, 591-99. A buyer of "farm products" is not protected apparently because so
many buyers are bulk purchasers who themselves finance the farmer. Coates, Chattel
Secured Farm Credit 39 (1954). The special priority in UCC § 9-312(3) apparently will
not apply to proceeds since that is not the "same collateral".
102 UCC § 9-312(5).
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First, the transaction between the purchase money financer and
the debtor must result in a perfected security interest "at the time
the debtor receives possession of the collateral"." 3
 Perfection in this
context initially requires that the security interest has "attached". 104
In addition, since a business debtor is involved, a proper filing must be
made in most cases.'" To benefit from this rule, the purchase money
secured party should file before the debtor receives possession of the
collateral. The grace period provided by the purchase money priority
rule for non-inventory financing' 06 is not allowed in the priority rule
for inventory financing.
Unlike consumer goods or equipment financing, these inventory
transactions usually involve at the outset persons who are familiar
with the demands of the law of chattel security, so that the need for
a grace period is not so great. More importantly, the grace period is
only excluded in cases involving conflicting claims to the same inven-
tory collateral. 707
 Thus, we are not here concerned with whether a
lien creditor should prevail over the secured party, but whether the
purchase money secured party should prevail over another secured
party who has done all that is required to obtain and to perfect an
effective prior interest. It probably would tip the scales too heavily
in favor of the purchase money interest to grant a grace period here
too. This becomes more apparent when one confronts the fact that
the special notice to other secured parties is required precisely
because another inventory financer may make future advances under
the assumption that he has obtained a first priority.'" The risk of
such advances by a competing inventory financer is as great during
the ten day grace period as it is thereafter.
Thus, the secured party ideally should proceed as follows:
(1) File;
(2) Notify those parties who appear from the public filings
at the time he files to have previously filed and those
whose security interest is known;
(3) Execute the security agreement with a contingent prom-
ise to pay value; and
(4) Assure that the debtor acquires rights in and possession
of collateral.
Minimally, the secured party should at least be certain that the filing
103 UCC § 9-312(3)(a).
104 UCC §§ 9-303 and 9-204.
105 Perfection of an interest in goods covered by negotiable documents occurs upon
perfection of an interest in the document. See text accompanying notes 126, 127 infra.
106 UCC § 9-312(4).
107 In contests with subsequent lien creditors and trustees in bankruptcy, the de-
layed filing within the ten day period is still effective. UCC § 9-301(2). See note 73
supra.
108 Comment 3 to UCC § 9-312.
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occurs before the debtor acquires possession of the collateral. The
notice required here adds a new kind of requirement in testing chattel
security priority.
Section 1-201 clarifies the meaning of the demand that the con-
flicting security interest holder must have "received notification of
the purchase money interest." Subsection (26) of Section 1-201 pro-
vides that a person "receives" a notice or notification "when
(a) it comes to his attention; or
(b) it is duly delivered at the place of business through which
the contract was made or at any other place held out by him as the
place for receipt of such communications." It is clear that the
purchase money holder must do more than dispatch such a notice to the
other secured party before the debtor obtains possession of the goods.
In addition, the purchase money claimant must be sure that the
notice has at least reached the place of business of the other secured
party prior to the time the debtor receives the collateral. Tinder
Section 1-201(27) more is required where the conflicting nonpurchase
money security interest is held by an "organization". In such cases
the purchase money holder must be sure that delivery to the debtor
is delayed until the notice is brought to the attention of the in-
dividual conducting the rival transaction, or until the notice would
have been brought to that person's attention if the organization had
exercised due diligence. Since a substantial majority of financings
will be effected by such "organizations", the purchase money financer
will be required to time his transaction so that the notice is sent far
enough in advance of delivery of the collateral to the debtor to assure
that the responsible person in the competing organization will receive
the notice.
This aspect of timing the notice is less severe on the secured party
than first appears, since the purchase money financer may satisfy the
requirement for a series of transactions by a single notice. Section
9-312(3)(c) inferentially indicates this conclusion when it provides
that the notice sent to the other secured party must describe such
inventory by "item or type". Thus, a notice indicating that purchase
money financing of "appliances" is contemplated should be sufficient
to protect the purchase money financer in a series of such transactions
with the same debtor. Nothing in Article 9 expresses a limit for the
duration of the effect of this notice. Caution would indicate that a
secured party should renew the notice at least as often as he renews
his filing under Section 9-403.' 1'
109
 In fact, the relatively long period provided by UCC § 9-403 may be too long
for this purpose. The suggestion has been made that experience may demonstrate the
need for a statutory standard for the duration of the notice called for in UCC § 9-312
(3). See Coogan, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Priorities Among Se-
cured Creditors and the "Floating Lien," 72 Harv. L. Rev. 838, 862 n.89 (1959).
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Under the 1958 amendments to Section 9-312(3), the purchase
money financer is required to notify other secured parties who have
filed prior to his filing, and thus he need not be concerned with sub-
sequent filings."° On the other hand, the section provides no such
cut-off point for notifying a secured party who "is known to the holder
of the purchase money security interest". Clearly, "known" means
actual knowledge. 1" It is conceivable that at some point after the
filing, the purchase money financer will receive actual knowledge of
another secured party. What should he do? His action should be
governed by the physical location of the goods. If the debtor has
received possession, then the notice would seem to be unnecessary.
If the debtor has not received possession of the collateral, the purchase
money secured party should give notice to the conflicting claimant
immediately.
The failure to notify a known unfiled security interest claimant
will not deprive the purchase money security interest of priority over
that claimant. The consequence is merely the loss of the special pur-
chase money priority. Under the 1958 amendments it is now clear
that the general rules of priority in Section 9-312(5) apply to any
case where the purchase money holder fails to meet the test for the
special priority. Consequently, under the first-to-file rule the purchase
money financer could take priority over the unnotified but known
rival claimant who had not filed. It is clear that knowledge is irrel-
evant under the general first-to-file priority rule of Section 9-312(5).
A similar result would obtain under the first-to-attach or first-to-
perfect rules.
The real peril to the purchase money financer who fails to notify
the holder of a known but unfiled interest lies in the fact that
Section 9-312(3) would literally deprive the purchase money financer
of any special priority even against rivals notified of the interest. The
purchase money financer obtains the benefit of the special priority
rule "if ... (b) any secured party ... has received notification. . . .' 12
Thus, if two competing filings are on record when the purchase
money financer files, he should notify both parties. Otherwise, he
risks losing his special priority against even the party notified.
Although no useful purpose would be served by such a result, the
history of chattel security obviously teaches the counsellor planning
the transaction to be prepared for such interpretations."'
Furthermore, in the context of failing to notify the unfiled but
known rival claim, we have seen that the purchase money holder may
110 Uniform Commercial Code, 1958 Supplement to the 1957 Official Text, p. 17.
111 UCC $ 1-201(25).
112 UCC § 9-312(3),
113 See Panel Discussion on Bankruptcy Problems, 9 Bus. Law., No. 2, Jan. 1954,
p. 96.
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nonetheless prevail over the unfiled claim. Consequently, unless the
failure to notify the known rival deprives the purchase money party
of his special priority as against all other secured parties, including
those actually notified, the requirement of notice to known and unfiled
claims will be meaningless. The problem here really stems from the
attempt to marry a statutory rule making the purchase money holder's
knowledge of the competing claim relevant.'" with a rule making
such knowledge irrelevant."8
This problem highlights another difficulty with the tests ex-
pressed in Section 9 -312(3) (b). Who is a "secured party whose se-
curity interest is known to the holder of the purchase money interest
or who . . . had filed"? Literally applying the Code definitional
scheme, a secured party is one "in whose favor there is a security
interest".116 One must look further to the definition of "security
interest" in Section 1-201(37), which basically defines the term as
"an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment
or performance of an obligation." It would thus appear that notice
must be sent only to those third parties who have acquired an attached
security interest under Section 9-204 and to whom the debtor owes an
"obligation" within Section 1-201(37). Under this kind of approach,
the question of who is entitled to notice would be most difficult to
unravel.'" For the lawyer planning the transaction the answer is
simple—notice should be sent to everyone who has filed prior to the
filing by the purchase money holder, and to every rival claimant
known prior to the delivery of the goods to the debtor.
Litigation as to the meaning of "secured party" in Section 9-312
(3) should only occur when this fundamental notion is violated.
Nonetheless, since many rival inventory lenders will properly file
before any value is extended,'" the question will eventually arise.,
In such circumstances there will be a gap between the filing and the
time that the competing lender actually acquires a security interest,
i.e., the time when an agreement is made, value is given, and the
debtor has rights in some collateral."' Clearly, notice should be sent
by a purchase money financer to such a "gap claimant" because other-
wise the latter lender may unwittingly make his advance or give
value relying on the collateral acquired under the purchase money
114 UCC § 9-312(3)(b).
115 UCC § 9-312(5).
116 UCC § 9-105(1)(i).
117 Since the notice would be sent only to those who had "attached" interests, the
purchase money financer would be investigating when the debtor obtained "rights" in
the collateral under Article 2, Sales, which tries to minimize the importance of title.
See Comment to UCC § 2-401.
118 This is likely, since the rival claimant will seek the benefits of the first-to-file
rule and will be making future advances. See UCC § 9-204(5).
119 UCC § 9-204.
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deal. Avoiding this kind of reliance is the basic purpose of the notice
requirement."' As a result, a literal reading of the statute should not
be the focus for determining who is entitled to notice.
(b) Two Conflicting Purchase Money Security Interests
in the Same Inventory Collateral.
In the discussion of the purchase money priority in equipment
and consumer goods financing, the problem of two conflicting purchase
money security interests in the same collateral was isolated and dis-
cussed.'" The same question can arise in the inventory framework.
In its simplest form the problem arises from the following facts:
Debtor Inc. buys one hundred new refrigerators on a conditional
sales contract basis. Sugar Sales Co. agrees to sell and finance the
sale but requires a twenty per cent cash down payment. Debtor
borrows the amount of the down payment from Local Bank and
signs a security agreement covering the same collateral. The problem
becomes acute where both secured parties seek to realize on their
security and the collateral has so far depreciated that both lenders
cannot be satisfied. Is it possible that both could qualify for the
purchase money interest special priority under Section 9-312(3)?
It is possible but less likely than in consumer goods or equipment
financing. In the simple transaction one of the secured parties would
probably file first, and the other financer would then be required to
notify the holder of the earlier filed interest. To the extent that such
a notice was specific in describing the collateral, the dual claims would
be immediately apparent to the recipient of the notice. Action could
then be taken by the seller to delay delivery to the buyer or by the
bank to delay the advance of funds. If neither course is possible, the
loan could be called before the collateral depreciated to the danger
point. 122
 A second reason for the conclusion that the dispute is less
likely in inventory financings is that in order to qualify for the special
priority, both purchase money parties must perfect their interest before
the debtor receives possession of the collateral. Perfection will usually
be by filing, and as a consequence of the lack of a grace period in
Section 9-312(3), there is more likelihood that one of the secured
parties will find a filing in favor of the other party when the record
is searched.
The problem can become more complex. Suppose that Local
Bank has a prior filing covering the inventory and an after-acquired
property clause in a prior agreement. If Local Bank makes an advance
120 Comment 3 to UCC § 9-312.
121
 See text following note 60 and extending to note 72 supra.
122
 This recommendation assumes the presence of an appropriately drafted accelera-
tion provision based upon breach of a covenant against liens and encumbrances. See also
IJCC § 1-208.
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under that prior agreement, and that advance is in fact used to meet
the down payment on the sale by Sugar Sales Co. to Debtor Inc.,
will Local Bank qualify as a purchase money financer? The definition
of purchase money security interest in Section 9-107(b) seems to
require of the non-selling lender a consciousness of the fact that the
advance is being made "to enable the debtor to acquire . . the
collateral."'" Thus, although Local Bank could show that it met
all the conditions of Section 9-312(3), it might not qualify for the
purchase money priority unless the advance was made specifically
for the purpose of enabling Debtor to acquire the collateral. If this
test could be met, then Local Bank would be able to qualify for
the priority if no secured party had made a prior filing and Local
Bank had no knowledge of any other secured parties. Sugar Sales Co.
would be required to notify Local Bank, however, if Sugar perfected
by filing. As noted earlier, this fact should aid in uncovering the dual
purchase money financers and offer Sugar Sales Co. a motive for
making its notice to Local Bank as specific as possible under the
circumstances.
(c) Other Secured Parties Claiming Through Documents.
The Code does not restrict the use of documents as collateral to
the inventory situation. Nonetheless, purchase money financing
through documents is discussed at this point, since the trust receipt
pattern of financing identifiable goods is the richest source of docu-
mentary transactions.
A purchase money security interest in goods may be created
under the Code through the use of documents of title.rm If non-
negotiable documents are involved, a security interest in the goods can
be perfected by:
(1) Filing as to the goods;
(2) The issuance of a non-negotiable document in the name
of the secured party; or
(3) The bailee's receipt of notification of the secured party's
interest.'"
In the case of negotiable documents the perfection of a security
interest in the document also perfects an interest in the goods in
125 If this analysis is followed, the possibility that two purchase money claims will
arise is diminished somewhat.
124
 In fact, a purchase money security interest can be asserted in any kind of col-
lateral, since the definition in UCC § 9-107 does not limit purchase money interests to
goods. Here, as noted subsequently, the perfection of an interest in the negotiable docu-
ments perfects an interest in goods also. UCC § 9-304(2).
125 The latter two methods of perfection can be viewed as a special means of
perfecting through taking possession of the collateral.
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possession of the issuer of the document.'" Filing as to the documents
or taking possession of the documents are two of the means avail-
able for perfecting an interest in negotiable documents.' In the
same manner that UTRA facilitated short term transactions,'"
Section 9-304(4) provides an "automatic" perfection for twenty-one
days when the security interest arises for new value under a written
agreement.'"
Where the purchase money security interest is thus perfected
through the use of negotiable documents alone, the ten day purchase
money grace period for filing in Section 9-301 is practically extended
to twenty-one days. No lien creditor, bulk transferee, or buyer not
in ordinary course could realize on the goods or the document until
after the twenty-one day automatic perfection period. In one sense
this provision may supply another special rule for purchase money
interests, since "new value" must be given to qualify for the "auto-
matic perfection", and purchase money is clearly "new value". 1"
On the other hand, the twenty-one day automatic perfection period
for negotiable documents is not explicitly limited to the purchase
money transaction.
With this foundation, we shall now address the question of the
relation of the documentary transaction to the special priority rule
for purchase money financing of inventory.' 31
One can argue that in the documentary setting the purchase money
priority rule is inapplicable, since that priority rule deals with "a
conflicing security interest in the same collateral".' 32 Since a con-
flicting security interest perfected in a negotiable document perfects
an interest in the goods in the possession of the issuer, it seems clear
that the conflict concerns the same collateral, i.e., the goods.
Furthermore, a purchase money security interest perfected
through the negotiable document takes priority over all other security
interests perfected while the goods are in the possession of the issuer.
In such disputes the documentary claimant will prevail apart from
Section 9-312(3). 133
Despite the strong position thus obtained by the purchase money
120 UCC § 9-304(2).
127 UCC §§ 9-304(1) and 9-305.
128 Uniform Trust Receipts Act §§ 8 and 2(1) (b) (limitation of thirty days; com-
pare the twenty-one day maximum in Bankruptcy Act § 60(a)(7)).
128
 Neither the Uniform Trust Receipts Act in Section 2(1)(b) nor the Code in
Section 9-304 expressly limits the automatic perfection of documents to purchase money
situations. Other cases where the secured party supplies "new value" also qualify.
Note that Uniform Trust Receipts Act § 2(1)(b) requires that the document be "ex-
hibited" to the entruster while UCC § 9-304(2) is silent in that regard. See note 73 supra.
130 Comment to UCC § 9-108.
131 UCC § 9-312(3).
182 Ibid. (Emphasis supplied.)
333 UCC § 9-304(2). This rule is specifically made controlling by UCC § 9-312(1).
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financer through negotiable documents, some questions may arise
which can be resolved only through Section 9-312(3). The cautious
documentary financer will thus send the notices called for by that
section.
If the documentary claimant is in conflict with one who asserts a
security interest perfected before the goods are in possession of the
issuer, then the special purchase money claim will be relevant.'
For example, a rival, claiming through a prior filing made in con-
nection with a security agreement covering after-acquired property,
may assert that his interest was perfected before the goods were de-
livered to the issuer of the document." Thus, the rival claimant
could assert that his security interest has priority under the first-to-
file or the first-to-perfect general rules. If the documentary financer
has complied with the notification requirements of Section 9-312(3),
he should prevail. Where the documentary financer "automatically"
perfects his security interest or perfects by taking possession of
the document, he will satisfy the notice requirement of Section 9-312
(3) by notifying all other known secured parties. If the security
interest in negotiable documents is filed, notices should be dispatched
to all other parties with a filed claim covering this type of collateral.
(d) Lien Creditors, Bulk Transferees, and Buyers Not in
Ordinary Course of Business.
Since the special priority rule provides no ten day grace period
for the inventory purchase money financer," the financer of new
acquisitions of inventory should not as a matter of practice rely on
the ten day grace period granted by Section 9-301(2) to all purchase
money security interests. If the financer takes advantage of this
grace period and delays making a required filing, he risks the auto-
matic loss of the special priority over other secured creditors offered
by Section 9-312(3), since the security interest will not necessarily
be perfected when the debtor "receives possession of the collateral". 137
A further reason for being certain that any required filing is made
prior to the debtor's obtaining possession of inventory collateral
134 Since the priority rule of UCC § 9-304(2) is explicitly limited to cases where
the conflicting security interest arises while the goods are in the possession of the issuer
of the negotiable document, the problem raised in the text will be governed by UCC
§ 9-312.
135 Under Article 2 a buyer may obtain sufficient "rights" in the collateral to permit
the after-acquired property interest to attach prior to the seller's delivery of the goods
to the carrier issuing the document; thus the documentary priority of UCC § 9-304(2)
would not apply. Where the documentary financer can succeed to the seller's rights
under UCC § 2-506 or UCC § 2-707, the documentary financer may be able to claim
prior perfection. See Hogan, The Marriage of Sales to Chattel Security in the Uniform
Commercial Code: Massachusetts Variety, 38 B.U.L. Rev. 571, 587-88 (1958).
136 UCC § 9-312(3).
137 Ibid.
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stems from the fact that the ten day grace period in Section 9-301(2)
only protects a purchase money financer of inventory against the
lien creditors and transferees in bulk described in Section 9-301(1).
As noted in the discussion of equipment,'" the Code is subject to the
interpretation that the unfiled and unperfected purchase money interest
will not be protected during the ten day period against other "buyers
not in the ordinary course of business" to the extent that such a buyer
gives value and receives delivery without knowledge of the security
interest.'" If this analysis is followed, how much does the inventory
financer who fails to make a required filing increase his risk during
the ten day grace period? The filed or unfiled perfected security
interest in inventory is not effective against buyers in ordinary
course of business under Section 9-307. 1 " Transferees in bulk cannot
assert rights because of the grace period. Other secured creditors will
be required to demonstrate priority under Section 9-312. What kind
of transferees are left?
The inquiry actually reduces itself to a determination of the
possibility that there are transferees not in the ordinary course of
business who are not transferees in bulk.
Questions have arisen under non-Code law concerning whether
one dealer, in purchasing from another dealer goods subject to a
filed trust receipt or conditional sales contract, qualifies as a "buyer
in ordinary course of business". At times the dealer-buyer has been
denied that status. 141 If the same result is reached under the Code
definition of "buyer in ordinary course", then we have another kind
of buyer not in ordinary course who may prevail over the purchase
money security interest during the ten day grace period. Conse-
quently, the ten day grace period for filing may not offer as complete
a protection to the inventory financer as first appears. Again, the
secured party should, if possible, file before the debtor obtains
possession of the collateral to avoid this risk and to preserve the
special priority provided in Section 9-312(3).
C. Inventory Collateral Which Is Not Readily Identifiable
1. Creating and Perfecting the Security Interest. The Code's
formulation of an integrated body of chattel security law will probably
have its greatest impact in the financing of what is here called inven-
tory collateral which is not readily identifiable. Where the goods are
in process, or are of relatively small value on a unit basis, or are
138
 See text following note 74 supra.
130 UCC	 9-301(1)(C).
140 See text accompanying notes 101 and 75 supra.
141 Most cases have not disqualified a subpurchaser because he happened to be a
dealer. See Colonial Finance Co. v. DeBenigno, 125 Conn. 626, 7 A.2d 841 (1939)
(trust receipts); Stemmons, Inc. v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 301 P.2d 212 (Okla.
1456) (floor plan statute).
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otherwise not susceptible to specific description, the individualizing
of the financing of each unit is impossible or at least impracticable.
Rigid rules of description, individualized recording requirements, and
stringent policing requirements in traditional mortgage law have been
abandoned in the Code"' and in the more modern non-Code inventory
security laws.'" Furthermore, the Code rejects the limitations placed
on the kind of debtors, or the kind of lenders who may take ad-
vantage of the flexibility of the newer security techniques. Providing
notice filing, authorizing central filing, validating after-acquired prop-
erty clauses, abolishing dominion rules, authorizing future advances
—all will help both the secured party and the debtor to use effectively
this class of inventory as collateral.'" In these cases a more general
description of the collateral is necessary and is permissible under the
Code so long as the description serves reasonably to identify the
collateral."' Similarly, the financing statement will necessarily be
more indefinite in describing the goods financed. Conflicts over the
collateral will nonetheless frequently involve the question whether
the particular property was subject to the security interest or was
covered by a filing. It is thus axiomatic that, as a matter of practice,
only one inventory financer should be engaged in financing this kind
of inventory collateral for a particular debtor. When the purchase
money financer dealing with such collateral finds that another financer
has made a prior filing, the purchase money holder should realize
that the nature of the collateral itself rather than any set of legal
rules will create serious problems. Such a unique question arises in
connection with ascertaining the priority of a purchase money financer
over other secured parties.
2. Contests With Other Secured Parties. When the financer
attempts to qualify for the purchase money special priority in Sec-
tion 9-312(3), he will meet the same problems discussed earlier."'
The primary difficulty will arise in connection with the fact that the
special priority only operates when the conflicting security claim relates
to the "same collateral". Frequently, the purchase money financer will
enable the debtor to acquire goods which are mingled with, attached
to, or processed into other goods. In this kind of transaction the
rival claimant can successfully assert that the purchase money prior-
ity no longer controls, since the purchase money security interest
142 Henson, Chattel Mortgages in Illinois v. Secured Transactions Under the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 9 De Paul L. Rev. 125, 135 (1960). .
143 Sutherland and Braucher, Trust Receipts in Texas, 14 Sw. L.J. 328, 339 (1960);
Silverman, Factoring: Its Legal Aspects and Economic Justification, 13 Law & Con-
temp. Prob. 593 (1948) ; Skilton, Factor's Liens on Merchandise, 1955 Wis. L. Rev. 356.
144 Coogan, Operating Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code Without
Help or Hindrance of the "Floating Lien", 15 Bus. Law. 373, 387 (1960).
145 UCC § 9- 110.
145 See text following note 101 supra.
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is not in the same collateral. Further, it seems clear that the purchase
money priority will not control to the extent that Sections 9-314
(Accessions) and 9-315 (Priority When Goods Are Commingled or
Processed) provide different rules for testing priority.'
No special treatment is extended to the purchase money financer
by reason of these provisions for accession and commingling or
processing. If the purchase money financer perfects by filing, he can
be certain that Section 9-315 governs his rights merely by claiming in
the filed statement a right to any products into which the goods have
been manufactured, processed, or assembled. In such a case the pur-
chase money financer will assure himself at least a pro rata equality
with other security interests in the product or mass.'" In fact, the
purchase money financer of a manufacturer's inventory collateral
which is not easily identifiable would be well advised always to claim
products in his financing statement, since by this means he will
assure himself of at least a pro rata equality in the finished goods
even where the collateral financed might be held to be identifiable.'"
How is the pro rata ratio for determining the relative shares of
the conflicting interests defined under the Code? The basic terms of
the ratio are defined in terms of costs of the goods)" Each secured
party shares in the amount realized on the sale of the product based
upon the ratio of the cost of the goods to which his interest originally
attached to the cost of the total product. For the purchase money
financer the cost of the goods to which his interest has attached will
usually be the price of the goods financed."' The other factor in the
ratio is more complicated. If a rival non-purchase money financer has
a -security interest in all inventory of the debtor, the rival security
interest will also originally attach to the goods subject to the purchase
money claim. For example: Local Bank has outstanding a non-
purchase money security agreement covering after-acquired property
and has advanced 20,000 dollars. Local Bank's security interest will
"originally attach" to the same collateral financed by the rival pur-
chase money financer and which we shall assume costs 1,000 dollars.
If the balance of the costs of the completed item is 8,000 dollars and
147
 UCC § 9-312(1).
118 UCC § 9-402(3) provides for a financing statement claiming an interest in
"products" without defining the term.
1" Under UCC § 9-315(1) (b) the commingling rule applies even where there has
been no "true commingling" in any case where the goods have been "manufactured,
,
processed or assembled." If the purchase money financer does not claim "products"
in this kind of case, priority will turn on the provisions of UCC § 9-314 where the
"winner takes all" without any pro rata sharing.
150 UCC 9-315(2).
151 "Costs" are not clearly defined, and an argument that the term includes more
than acquisition price, contrary to the conclusion in the text, may be made from the fact
that elsewhere the Code uses terms clearly indicating "price". UCC 11 9-107, 9-302-
(1)(c), 9-307(2), and 9-505.
153
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
there is no other claim, the purchase money financer will apparently
receive one tenth of the realization value of the assets and the Local
Bank will receive nine tenths of that amount. 152 It is noteworthy that
the amount of the debt is not relevant in this formula except that it
puts a maximum limitation on any ultimate recovery. Similarly, there
is no consideration given to which of the conflicting claims was first-
to-file, first-to-perfect, or first-to-attach.
If the provisions of Section 9-315 are not made applicable
by an appropriate claim of an interest in products in the financing
statement, and the financed goods are not installed or affixed to other
goods without loss of identity, then the Code's accession rule operates.
Here, the Code does attempt to do more than provide for a ratable
distribution of claims. If the purchase money financer is to obtain
maximum protection by this route, he must be certain that his se-
curity interest is perfectedt  prior to the time the goods are installed
or affixed. If perfection occurs before this time, the financer of the
goods installed will prevail over secured creditors who claim under
a prior agreement or filing as to the product, as well as those who
claim under a subsequent agreement or filing. Compliance with the
suggestions of filing at the earliest practicable time or at least before
the debtor obtains possession of inventory collateral will meet the
test.
IV. CONCLUSION
Two major questions emerge from the foregoing analysis of the
Code pthvisions treating the purchase money security interest. First,
what is the basis for the privileged treatment afforded to this kind
of security under the Code? Second, do the problems raised indicate
that the enactment of the Code will impede the financing of the
acquisition of new goods?
The first and more difficult question explores the basis for
the special treatment afforded to purchase money transactions. As
noted previously, history is on the side of the Code."' Legitimating
the judgment of history is another matter.
At the outset the suggestion was made that the privileged posi-
tion of the financer of incoming goods was in major part due to our
1 52
 The purchase money financing interests "attached" to $1,000 worth of collateral,
and the bank's interest "attached" to $9,000 worth of collateral; consequently, the ratio
is 1:10 and 9:10.
In See notes 18 and 31 supra. In reorganizations under former Section 775 of the
Bankruptcy Act, a divided court held that a conditional seller could recapture the goods,
since the subject matter of the sale was not "property" of the debtor to be included
in the reorganization plan. In re Lake's Laundry, Inc., 79 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1935).
Compare In re White Plains Ice Service, Inc., 109 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1940). The
present broad definition of "transfer" in Bankruptcy Act 1(30) casts further doubt on
this decision.
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national concern for moving goods from the maker to the user.'"
Elsewhere in the law we have been developing a concept of negotia-
bility of goods on the same sort of premise."' It is not surprising then
that we have also extended somewhat unusual protections to the
secured sales financer in contests with the purchaser's creditors."'
When we turn to the narrower issue of avoiding harm to other
creditors of the buyer, it appears that the purchase money financer
supplies a special kind of "new value", since the debt for the price is
obviously not antecedent to the bargain for the secured position.'"
Other lenders may supply fresh consideration in the form of cash, but
the pre-Code devices which were not limited to purchase money trans-
actions did not necessarily reveal the "new value" on their face. On
the other hand, the conditional sale and the trust receipt were limited
to the acquisition of goods, and thus it was made clear that antecedent
creditors could not have been deceived by the ostensible ownership
of the collateral by the debtor at the time credit was extended. Con-
sequently, delayed recording here could only mislead the "gap cred-
itors", and this is a small price to pay for facilitating the flow of the
goods."'
Further, the security agreement in pre-Code devices also clearly
revealed that a particular debt was related to some particular prop-
erty. Thus, the conditional sales and trust receipt categories mini-
mized the possibility of the parties later fictitiously and fraudulently
swelling the amount of the debt or the amount of the collateral cov-
ered by the agreement. A judicial desire to avoid creditor deception
and the sham security transaction has long bottomed our chattel
security law, and the purchase money deal minimizes both of these
154 See text p. 115 supra.
155
 Vold, The Law of Sales, Preface (2d ed. 1959) ; Gilmore, Commercial Doctrine
of Good Faith Purchase, 63 Yale L.J. 1057 (1954).
15a UCC	 9-307 protects buyers who qualify against perfected security interests
without regard to the purchase money notion.
157 Purchase money is not always a requisite to the preferred status. UCC
§ 9-304(4) automatically perfects any security interests in negotiable documents to the
extent that the interest arises for "new value". See UCC 9-108. Bankruptcy Act
60a(7) also permits a limited delayed recording where a transfer is for "new value"
without reference to purchase money.
158 This is contrary to much chattel mortgage law; see Karst v. Cane discussed at
note 73 supra. When protection is extended to the purchase money financer without
any public recordation for the duration of the loan as under UCC I; 9-302(1)(c) and
(d), the justification can be that other creditors will not rely on any public record or
can find out about the security interest by other means. See text following note 31
supra.
159 Honnold, Cases and Materials, Sales and Sales Financing 384 (1953). In a
short but perceptive note following the case of Clow v. Woods, 5 S. & R. 275, 9 Am.
Dec. 346 (Pa. 1819), the editor suggests that these two arguments are often mingled
in decisions upsetting chattel mortgages. One might add that under UCC § 2-305 the
price secured by the purchase money interest may be enforceable although not settled.
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In this light it is clear that to the same extent that the so-called
"floating lien" problems can be avoided by the continued use of the
patterns of financing developed under the pre-Code law,'" most of
the issues raised here can be avoided by the continuance of the earlier
business practices of the sales financing industry. These non-Code
methods of operation should only be modified where the Code adopts
new requirements, such as the notice called for by Section 9-312(3).
If the purchase money financers set out to modify entirely their pres-
ent techniques in light of the most liberal Code rules, then the ques-
tions raised here will reach the litigation stage. Experience alone will
demonstrate whether additional amendments of the Code provisions
will be required!'" To these remarks one must add the comment that
in some instances the casual reader of the purchase money provisions
of Article 9 may be lulled into inaction where action is required for
the fullest measure of protection.'" On the whole, the careful student
of the Code should conclude that the benefits of a single integrated
body of modern chattel security law outweigh the few detriments!"
In some instances the seller will be able to fix the price so that a purchase money secu-
rity interest may not be for a fixed amount.
1013
 Coogan, Operating Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code Without
Help or Hindrance of the "Floating Lien", 15 Bus. Law. 373 (1960).
161
 Possible revisions suggested here include: Elaboration of the definition of a
purchase money security interest in UCC § 9-107 to clarify the timing of the acquisition
of the goods and the giving of value; revision of the special purchase money priority
rules in UCC § 9-312(3) and (4) to provide for pro rata sharing by two competing
non-seller purchase money security interests and to make it clear whether the failure
of the purchase money inventory financer to notify one rival will result in loss of the
special priority of UCC § 9-312(3) as against notified competing secured parties; and
the clarification of UCC § 9-301(2) to make it clear that no buyer not in ordinary course
of business can prevail over the purchase money financer during the ten day grace period.
162 A purchase money security interest in certain consumer goods and farm equip-
ment transactions is perfected without filing under UCC § 9-302, but is not fully effective
against subpurchasers unless filed. UCC § 9-307(2). Further, a purchase money security
interest in inventory collateral does not obtain the priority advantages of UCC § 9-312-
(3) unless the security interest is perfected when the debtor receives the collateral, even
though UCC § 9-301(2) permits a ten day grace period.
163 The experience in Massachusetts since 1958 and in Pennsylvania since 1954
has been favorable to the Code and particularly to Article 9. Malcolm and Funk,
Pennsylvania and Massachusetts Experience Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 16
Bus. Law. 52.5 (1961).
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